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From Constitutions to Constitutionalism:
An Opportunity for Arab States, not a Paradox
Asem Khalil∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Most contemporary states have adopted writ and rigid constitutions. A constitution presumes
the existence of a constituent power, distinct from the constituted powers, which are created
by the constitution itself. If one admits that the constituent power refers to a pre‐existing
collective, i.e. a ‘We’ that are able, as a collective who is aware of being so, to will and to
express that will in a comprehensive and distinctive way, then one cannot deny the simple
conclusion which implies that a constituent power entails a representative claiming to talk in
the name of that ‘We’.1 This is the paradox of constitutionalism, to which some scholars refer.2
Asem Khalil, Research Fellow, Global Hauser, NYU School of Law, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Public
Administration, Birzeit University. The author thanks Nathan Brown, Baudouin Dupret, Conrado Mendes, Hans
Lindahl, Richard Pildes, and Chantal Thomas for their comments on earlier draft of this paper, and all those who
participated in the discussion of the paper during the Third Annual Conference of the Toronto Group (University of
Toronto) on 30 January 2010 and the Global Hauser Forum (New York University) on 9 March 2010.
∗

1

See H. Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in THE
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 9, 9‐26 (M. Loughlin and N. Walker eds., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007).
2

In a recent book, M. Loughlin and N. Walker argued that: “Modern constitutionalism is underpinned by two
fundamental though antagonistic imperatives: that governmental power ultimately is generated from the ‘consent
of the people’ and that, to be sustained and effective, such power must be divided, constrained, and exercised
through distinctive institutional forms. The people, in Maistre’s words, ‘are a sovereign that cannot exercise
sovereignty’; the power they possess, it would appear, can only be exercised through constitutional forms already
established or in the process of being established. This indicated what, in its most elementary formulation, might
be called the paradox of constitutionalism.” M. Loughlin and N. Walker, Introduction, in THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1, 1 (M. Loughlin and N. Walker eds., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007). Referring to this
tension between constituent power and constituted power as ‘paradox’ is not convincing for others. Galligan, for
example, reviewing the above book, doubted the utility of such ‘paradox’ for constitutional theory, noticing that:
“Modern constitutionalism, the editors of the collection of essays under review claim, has at its centre a paradox
between the people as sovereign or constituent power and the constitution; constitutions are the creation of the
people yet, once created, impose restraints on them.” Then he added: “The alleged paradox is taken seriously in a
few, paid lip‐service in others and ignored in the rest. That is a good thing since the paradox is of limited utility to
constitutional theory.” D. J. Galligan, The Paradox of Constitutionalism or the Potential of Constitutional Theory, 28
OJLS 343, 343 (2008). Others, perhaps more appropriately, use ‘paradox’ not to describe constitutionalism as such,
but rather to describe its possible accommodation with other concepts such as sovereignty and/or democracy:
“Constitutionalism, democracy and sovereignty are both complementary and conflicting terms. At one level, the
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The two imperatives of modern constitutionalism are, indeed, that of governmental power, on
one hand, which is generated by the ‘consent of the people,’ and, on the other hand, in order
to be sustained and effective, such power must be divided, constrained and exercised through
distinctive institutional forms.3 This paradox reflects the dilemma that arises from the
dialectical interaction between constituent power and constitutional form, between
democracy, as the rule of the people, and the rule of law. The only way out seems to be the
adoption of a specific concept of democracy that is nothing else but a political organization,
that, appealing to the rule of law, postpones the acts of attribution by establishing the minimal
conditions under which such acts may be viewed, ever provisionally, as acts of the people.4
This suggestion has the advantage of resolving the paradox in constitutionalism: the rule of law
is presented as a camouflage, in which the appearance of attribution to the people is presented
as an alternative to the real attribution. In a sense, however, it seems that the camouflage is a
necessary, almost inevitable, fiction; largely because it is impossible to know what the people
want – admitting at the first place that the people can ever have one unique will5 – but most
importantly, because even those who pretend to know what the people want and pretend to
have the authority to express that will, are – if they want to be coherent with what they
pretend – always subject and subordinate to the continuously changing will of the people; in
other words, it is by their same presupposition (expressing the people’s will) that they may be
discredited or even resisted by other competing authorities. Such situation leads inevitably to
what can be described as a continuous and perpetual revolution, ergo to the complete opposite
of what political organization is, at first place.
The rejection of constitutionalism in Arab states, which means the rejection of both democracy
and the Rule of the law, in the name of that ‘people’, with its cultural and religious particularity
(in which case Arab or Muslim state is presented as special, unique, to be distinguished from
other kinds of state, such as Western states for example) is nothing else but a contradiction.
The simple fact that a people are defined by a political organization at the first place means that
constitutional desire to subject the exercise of state power to certain normative limits appears to be at odds with
both assertions of popular and national sovereignty and the related view that the only legitimate source of law or
value lies with the people and the institutions that embody their will. At another level, constitutions may be seen
as providing the rules and institutional mechanisms necessary to give expression to that will.” R. Bellamy,
Introduction: Constitutionalism, democracy and Sovereignty, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY:
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 1, 1 (R. Bellamy ed., Averbury, 1996). It is within this last precision that I make
use of the ‘paradox of constitutionalism’ in this paper.
3

See Loughlin and Walker, supra note 2, at 1.

4

See Lindahl supra note 1, at 24.

5

It is true that the people are assimilated with a subject, but the people are never an ‘I’ but always a ‘We’.
Accordingly, the people, by definition is always plural, and its will is by definition multiple. The fiction is in
pretending that the ‘We’ had spoken as an ‘I’ and that the democracy – perceived as the rule of the majority – as
much as the rule of law are the tools that make this possible.
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the time of complete revolution is over, and the fiction of minimal attribution had started. In
such a context, the use of the ‘people’ to reject limitation on government is only an excuse of
the existing regimes to resist transition to democracy and the rule of law.
In this paper, I will suggest considering constitutionalism as an opportunity, rather than a
paradox, for contemporary Arab states in need for justifying their authority, their legitimacy,
and their same existence as states. I will first assess how ‘popular sovereignty’ is central in most
constitutions of Arab states (Section II). Despite the democratic deficiency present in most Arab
states, this reference is relevant in that it is connected to an identity, which needs to be
justified by reference to the state‐produced constitution and law (Section III). This people
(demos) compete with other narratives, including Arab nationalism, and Islamism. For both, the
state is a too narrow to include the Arab nation or the Islamic umma (Section IV). While
territorial nationalism seems to prevail, the issue of pre‐established identity, and the impact it
has on the state is remarkable, and need to be duly considered (Section V). In such a context,
the constitution, more than a binding law limiting the government, is only one of the many
ways the existing regimes talk to different constituencies, whether local, regional, or
international, searching for legitimacy (Section VI). A different ways of looking at Shari‘a in
constitutional text is also discussed, i.e. a reading that sees in this the development of what
some called Islamic constitutionalism (Section VII). Finally, I will suggest relocating the
discussion regarding modern constitutionalism, to connect it with the development of both
international law and national domestic legal systems, following the Second World War
(Section VII). In the conclusion, I will suggest redirecting the debated towards the theory of the
state, rather as an issue of accommodation of specific culture or religion in the state legal order
(Section IX).
Arab states may refer to remote historical, cultural, social and political experiences.
Nevertheless, in their current territorial forms, they are a very recent product. Whether this
was a colonial product,6 or a genuine development,7 a reaction against anarchism,8 or victory
6

This is the case, at least, for most of them. For some scholars, this modern concept of state is alien to ‘Arabs’
since originally they were a tribal society, not citizens –they were only kinsmen united by blood ties. See, e.g., P. J.
VATIKIOTIS, ISLAM AND THE STATE 19 (London, Croom Helm 1987). Accordingly, for them it may be simply the result of
colonialism and as a result of the impact of Western powers on them.
7

Iliya Harik, for example, traces the origin of various Arab states, and identifies their structure, power base,
legitimacy, and traditions by proposing five different types of state: (1) the imam‐chief system as in the case of
North Yemen, Oman and Morocco; (2) the alliance system of chiefs and imams as in Saudi Arabia; (3) the
traditional secular system in which authority is invested in a dynasty, free from religious attributes as in Lebanon
and the smaller Gulf States; (4) the bureaucratic‐oligarchy type in which authority is basically in the urban caste of
garrison commanders, assisted by an extensive administrative apparatus as in Egypt and the North Africa States;
and (5) the colonially‐created state system, comprising the Fertile Crescent States (with the exception of Lebanon),
carved from the defunct Ottoman Empire by the European colonial powers. See Gh. Salamé, Introduction, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 1, 5‐6 (Gh Salamé ed., London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987). For more on this subject, see
I. Harik, The Origins of the Arab State System, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 19, 19‐46 (Gh Salamé ed.,
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facilitated by the absence of alternatives,9 contemporary Arab states are indeed largely
artificially shaped.10 In such a context, the state, each state, needs to make a choice between
many normative orders that compete. In this paper I will argue that constitutionalism is one of
those options available; most importantly, I will argue that there are good reasons to believe
that opting for constitutionalism may be much more attractive that opting for other normative
orders.

II. ARAB CONSTITUTIONS AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
The ‘Constitution’, identified since the eighteenth century with a single document governing
the government, has its roots in two historical experiences, the American and French
London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987). Such historical data suggest that only limited number of Arab states (particularly
the Fertile Crescent) are the direct creation of colonialism, and the British and French antagonism in the Middle
East, as argued by Burhan Ghalioun for example: "[Q]uant au Croissant Fertile, il est partagé entre des Etats
artificiels distribués en zones d’influences aux colonialismes antagonistes anglais et français." B. GHALIOUN, LE
MALAISE ARABE ‐ L'ETAT CONTRE LA NATION 24 (Paris, La Découverte 1991). Admitting that the above thesis related to
the origin of territorial Arab states is correct, it is nonetheless undeniable that colonialism and foreign interference
largely influenced the boundaries of territorial Arab states and gave them the shape they have right now. Iliya
Harik himself recognizes that: “Colonialism affected the boundaries of Arab states, but it did not, with the
exception of the Fertile Crescent case, create them. Colonialism gave more definitive form to the indigenous states
and introduced elements of modern administration to them.” Quoted in: Salamé, supra, at 6. For Bahgat Korany:
“The present demarcation of the Arab territorial state is indeed a phenomenon made in Europe. Three historical
phases are traced: a) the rise and the characteristics of the Westfalia system of 1648 which ended Europe’s wars of
religion and initiated an international system of sovereign states; b) dismemberment of the Ottoman empire and
its integration into the European system; and c) the rise of the mandate system in its place and the resulting Arab
territorial states.” B. Korany, Alien and Besieged Yet Here to Stay: The Contradictions of the Arab Territorial State,
in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 47, 48 (Gh Salamé ed., London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987). However, if the foreign
origin of territorial Arab states, in fact, may provide an explanation of the creation of many Arab states (as much as
many other states in all over the world), it cannot explain or justify their continuing consolidation and supremacy.
As pointed out by Korany: “An important question should then be explicitly raised: if the contradictions of the Arab
territorial state are closely related to its foreign origin, does this foreign origin provide sufficient and necessary
reasons also to explain its continuing consolidation and supremacy?” Id. at 73.
8

Accordingly, territorial states are simply a reaction against archaism and a kind of adaptation to new world order.
As pointed out by Ghalioun, the Arab state is not the embodiment of the oriental or Islamist state, but is the
reaction or fear of archaism in the Arab world. Arabs in fact felt the necessity to adapt themselves to the new
world order. See Ghalioun, supra note 7, at 53‐66.
9

The absence of alternatives such as a ‘pan‐’ state, whether Islamic or Arab nationalist, has until now failed to
realize its objectives. See Korany, supra note 7, at 74.
10

The debate over the origin of modern Arab states had never really come to an end. As pointed out by Salamé:
“This particular debate, concerning the original sin of state creation, was never closed in the Arab World. To what
extent these Arab states were created by a foreign, alien, and hostile will?” Salamé, supra note 7, at 3.
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Revolutions.11 Based on those historical roots,12 the diffusion of written constitutions and the
ideas that supported it,13 since then, is remarkable.14 A ‘written constitution’, deemed old‐
fashioned for old democracies,15 is increasingly considered the best way for new nations to
‘write down’ their constitutional commitments and compromises.16 However, the “worldwide
embrace of written constitution”17 can be explained partially by being a legitimating tool for the
11

See E.C.S. WADE, G.G. PHILIPS and A.W. BRADLE, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (London, Longman 1977).

12

This diffusion is rooted in three different sources: First, the American source: colonies could adapt charters that
did not contradict British statutes and customs. Second, the philosophical and French source: it was necessary to
initiate a new order, considering the constitution as the initial act of the national sovereignty and the renewal of
the social contract, in order to distinguish between ordinary and constitutional laws. Third, the federal source: in
order to organize relations between the federal state and federated states and to protect the pact from arbitrary
changes in the future, without unanimous approval of all those concerned and following precise procedures.
JOSEPH‐BARTHELEMY, P. DUEZ, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 188‐91 (Paris, Economica 1985).
13

According to Esmein, the eighteenth century concept of constitution as a fundamental and systematic written
law is based on three ideas: 1) The superiority of a written law over a customary one was generally agreed on at
the time: the same should apply to constitutional law; 2) The people of the eighteenth century Revolution
considered a new constitution, edited by national sovereignty, as a true renewal of the social contract: as such, it
was necessary to register the clauses of that contract in the most solemn and complete form; 3) They thought that
a clear, systematic presentation of such a document in a clear and systematic way would provide an excellent
means of political education, since it would provide the citizens with the knowledge and desire for their rights. See
A ESMEIN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANÇAIS ET COMPARE 603‐4 (1927).
14

Arjomand distinguishes five stage s in world constitutional history, each with its typical mode of constitution‐
making: 1) The medieval and pre‐modern era down to the eighteenth century. 2) The modern stage of political
reconstruction rational design in the age of democratic revolutions in the late eighteenth century. 3) The age of
modernization in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 4) The era of ideological
constitutions as instrument of social transformation according to total ideologies and their offspring (1917‐1989).
5) The era of new constitutionalism since 1989. See Saïd Amir Arjomand, Constitutional Development and Political
Reconstruction from Nation‐Building to New Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 3,
6‐7 (Saïd Amir Arjomand ed., Leiden – Boston, Brill 2007). The booming of constitutions, however, occurred with
th
the new wave of independence in the second half of the 20 century. As pointed out by Go: “In the second half of
th
the 20 century, at least 91 countries emerged into statehood from western colonial rule. Upon independence,
they each drafted and promulgated a national constitution. Moreover, 65 percent of these postcolonial states have
rewritten their original constitution since independence, in many cases more than once.” Julian Go, A Globalizing
Constitutionalism? Views from the Postocolony, 1945‐2000, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 89, 89
(Saïd Amir Arjomand ed., Leiden – Boston, Brill 2007). A new wave of constitutional movement occurred in post‐
Communist constitutional reconstruction of the 1990s. See Arjomand, supra, at 4.
15

As pointed out by Ackerman: “A funny thing happened to Americans on the way to the twenty first century. We
have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional commitments in the old‐fashioned way. This is no small
problem for a country that imagines itself living under a written Constitution.” Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution 120 HARV. L. REV 1737, 1741 (2007).
16

As pointed out by Arjomand, “[c]onstitutional politics, when successful, typically result in compromises, in
written constitutions[.]” Arjomand, supra note 14, at 6‐7.
17

Ackerman, supra note 15, at 1800.

8
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newly established state, within the community of nations.18 According to Dahrendorf’s three‐
stage universal sequence of state‐building, writing a constitution is the very first.19 Nowadays,
very few states are completely without any form of formally drafted or codified constitution.20
Arab states had passed through the different waves of constitutional movements all over the
world.21 They share the overwhelming interest in written and rigid constitutions (although
18

For Sathyamurthy, a written constitution serves as an instrument of political cohesion in Postcolonial states:
“Constitutions were expected to fulfill a dual role, enabling a smooth and orderly transition from anticolonial
struggle to independent self‐rule, and at the same time securing for the new regime the political fruits of
nationhood, new state structures, legitimacy (domestic and international), and sovereignty[.]” T. V. Sathyamurthy,
The Constitution as an Instrument of Political Cohesion in Postcolonial States: The Case of India, 1950‐1993, in
DESIGNS FOR DEMOCRATIC STABILITY: STUDIES IN VIABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM 147, 147 (A. I. Baaklini and H. Desfosses eds.,
Armonk, New York, London, M.E. Sharpe 1997). Based on empirical comparative study between constitutions of
post‐colonial states, Go argues: “The very fact that all postocolonial countries adopted written constitutions
th
indicates that by the mid‐20 century, when decolonization began, any state entering the system had to have a
singly‐document constitution in order to be a legitimate nation.” Go, supra note 14, at 92. This explains largely why
even the United Kingdom, historically without a written constitution, encouraged the codification process in the
ex‐colonies, even before independence, and helped shape written constitutions for territories under its mandate,
such as was the case of Transjordan (the Basic Law of 1923 and 1928, and the Constitution of 1947), and Palestine
under British mandate (the Palestine Order in Council of 1922).
19

See R. Dahrendorf, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE (London, Chatto and Windus 1990). Cited in: Go, supra
note 14, at 111.
20

See JAN‐ERIK LANE, CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 135 (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1996). It shall
be noted, however, that not all constitutions conform to the demands of constitutionalism, and constitutionalism
is not dependent on the existence of written constitutions. However, as pointed out by Rosenfeld “the realization
of the spirit of constitutionalism generally goes hand in hand with the implementation of written constitution.”
Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Diversity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., Durham and London, Duke
University Press 1994).
21

Nathan Brown divides what he calls “The history of Arab constitutional documents” into three periods. “In the
th
19 century, regimes ruling much of the Arab world experimented with written constitutions in response to fiscal
th
and international crisis. In the first half of the 20 century, newly independent Arab states issued written
constitutions in order to affirm their sovereignty. And in the 1960s and 1970s, constitutions become ideological
manifestos for self‐styled revolutionary regimes.” Nathan Brown, Regimes Reinventing themselves: Constitutional
Development in the Arab World, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 47, 49 (Saïd Amir Arjomand ed.,
Leiden – Boston, Brill 2007). After presenting the three periods, Brown questions whether one can talk of a “Fourth
Constitutional Moment?” He argues indeed that, “Arab states have come under a variety of domestic and
international pressures; and constitutional design and redesign have provided them some tools for crafting
constitutional responses. The global resurgence of liberalism; the desire to allow for sharply controlled democratic
openings; the need to parry opposition as regimes jettison welfare commitments and confront fiscal crisis the
exigencies of political succession; and (in dramatic case) foreign invasion have inspired some constitutional
experimentation.” Id. at 56. Interestingly, the Constitution of Egypt of 1971 stated in Article 1 that the Arab
Republic of Egypt is a state which system is “democratic and socialist”. In 1980 amendment, the order switched to
“socialist and democratic”. In the 2007 amendment, it simply disappeared from the text. For more, see the
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often as camouflage22 and façade23 constitutions). They also follow the global trend towards
constitutional structures, and constitutionalism in general.24 In the 1990s, a new era of
‘transition to democracy’ took place, especially in the post‐Communist countries Eastern
Europe and Russia.25 Arab states did not miss this new era of constitutionalism; many Arab
constitutions, indeed, were re‐written, amended, or even adopted for the first time.26
collection of Egyptian constitutions, compiled by the Shura Council of Egypt (p.419, n. 1), available online (in
Arabic) at: http://www.shoura.gov.eg/const_pdf/constitution_main.pdf
22

This occurs in case of states that have formally drafted constitutional documents without for that reason being
actually employed in the real life operations of the State. The written constitution is simply not being
implemented. See LANE, supra note 20, at 134‐5.
23

“Façade constitution” refers to the situation that occurs when a government is established without being
accepted by the people. Constitutions, in contrast, are premised on the acceptance of state power as legitimate.
“A façade constitution can declare aspirational principles and adopt power structures for government, but such
provisions and principles are ineffective and potentially delegitimized because they are not followed in practice....”
Larry C. Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems,
PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 675 [2009], quoting Note, Counterinsurgency and Constitutional Design 121 HARV. L. REV. 1622,
1632 (2008). It is true that such constitutions may not serve as regulatory law, instruments of a limited
government, or ground rules rather they serve as ‘program constitutions’. As pointed out by Frankenberg liberal
constitutionalism often dismiss such façade constitutions (making reference to the ‘socialist constitutions’). For
him this is something deplorable, because dismissing those constitutions means missing the stories program
constitutions can tell us. Günter Frankenberg, Comparing constitutions: Ideas, ideals, and ideology—toward a
layered narrative, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 439, 453 (2006). Similar argument can be advanced to Arab constitutions. They
may not correspond to liberal constitutionalism but they still have something to tell. In such a context, having a
written constitution may serve the objective of creating a façade constitution, setting out a program not a
regulatory tool. As pointed out by Nathan Brown, it is the existing regimes in the Arab world that had composed
the constitutions not the other way around. In this sense, constitutions were designed to enable these existing
regimes, whether through fiscal reform, establishing sovereignty, or proclaiming new ideological directions. See
Brown, supra note 21, at 55. For him: “most constitutional documents [in the Arab World] have been promulgated
less by the nation assembled than by existing regimes seeking tools to enable them to face domestic and
international challenges.” Id. at 48.
24

As pointed out by Brown: “the past two decades have seen a definite (if limited) upsurge of interest in
constitutionalism in the Arab World.” Id. at 48. The author, however, cautions, this change should not obscure an
underlying continuity: “while the Arab world has joined the global trend toward greater interest in constitutional
structures, the changes of the past few decades have not reversed the patterns of the past: constitutions remain
enabling documents in variety of settings.” Id. at 49.
25

That some calls ‘new democracies’ (See Cindy Skach, The "newest" separation of powers: Semipresidentialism, 5
INT.L J. CONST. L. 93, 96 (2007)) that resulted from the ‘post‐Communist constitutional reconstruction’ (See
Arjomand, supra note 14). A period that some called ‘transition to democracy’ (See W. Osiatynski, Paradoxes of
Constitutional Borrowing 2 INT.L J. CONST. L. 244, 249 (2003)), ‘transition from post‐authoritarian regimes’ (See M.
Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25 OJLS 183, 189 (2005)), ‘transition from one‐party rule
to constitutional democracy’ (see J. Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: an Introduction 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
447, 447 (1991)). In this period, many constitutional changes were introduced. This period of constitutionalism is
characterized by a process of “de‐ideologization of the communist constitutions”. Arjomand, supra note 14, at 18.
For more about the so called semi‐presidentialism form of government, see Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation
of Powers 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 633‐729 (2000). It shall be noted that this movement was not limited to post‐
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Accordingly, despite having a lot in common, each Arab State has its own constitutional history.
Constitutional structures vary according to the state concerned, and the place, role of written
constitutions vary according to each country.27 This means that any generalization – that even

communist countries, though. Similar movement occurred in all over the world. Based on empirical data, Go shows
that many of the postcolonial constitutions in existence in 2000 were written in the 1990s. See Go, supra note 14,
at 97‐8. This is why some authors talk about the era of “new constitutionalism” (See Arjomand, supra note 14, at 3)
or ‘new globalizing constitutionalism’ (See Go, supra note 14, at 103). Similar movement, as rightly pointed out by
is also present in the Arab world, that Nathan Brown calls “constitutional experimentation” while questioning
whether or not it could be considered as a “Fourth Constitutional Moment.” Brown, supra note 21, at 56. Before
that, the author presented the three stages of constitutional history in the Arab world. See id. at 49‐56.
26

Such signs of change can be seen in three different ways. First, many Arab monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula,
historically the most reluctant to issue constitutions have finally joined the fold, adopting new constitutions. This is
the case of Saudi Arabia and Oman which adopted Basic Laws in the 1990s, United Arab Emirates made its former
“temporary” constitution, a permanent one. Kuwait restored full parliamentary and constitutional life in 1992 and
similar process occurred in Bahrain in 2002. Yemen, the only republic of the Peninsula, wrote a new constitution in
1991. Second, some other Arab countries had amended their constitutional texts or issued new ones to negotiate
political liberalization, such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Third, in few other countries,
former constitutional structures (mainly constitutional courts and parliament) have begun to revive allowing for
some constitutional openings. This is the case of Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, or the parliamentary
experience of Jordan, Palestine and Kuweit. Fourth, a special case of constitution making in Iraq occurred after the
American invasion. This process is directly related to this forced change in the regime. See id. at 56‐66.
27

In the Arab world, constitutions may describe a variety of political structures: federal, as in the United Arab
Emirates and the Sudan; unitary, as in Tunisia; a constitutional monarchy, as in Jordan; a republic, as in Egypt; or a
traditional hereditary monarchy, as in Saudi Arabia. While most Arab constitutions are documents with roughly
similar provisions, some constitutions are noteworthy products of historical and political circumstances. In Saudi
Arabia, for example, the Koran itself is considered the constitution, accompanied by a series of royal decrees
compiled to function as a manual for the application of its principles. In Libya, the Constitutional Proclamation, the
Green Book written by Muammar Qaddafi and the People’s Declaration together constitute the Basic Law of the
land. Procedures for constitutional amendments vary; sometimes requiring direct referenda or legislative action,
while in some countries, the head of the state may issue amendments by decree. However, most Arab states
adapted written and rigid constitutions. In previous study I indentified some of those characteristics: 1) Many Arab
states adapted constitutions after independence (Algiers gained independence on 5 July 1962, and adopted its
Constitution on 10 September 1963 (suspended in 1965; the second Constitution was adopted in 1976 and
amended in 1979, 1988, 1989, 1996); Bahrain gained independence on 15 August 1971, and adopted its
Constitution on 6 December 1973 (suspended in 1975 and adopted the National Charter in 2001 after a popular
referendum); the United Arab Emirates gained independence on 2 December 1971 and adopted a provisional
constitution on the same date (that became permanent in 1996); Kuwait gained independence on 19 July 1961 and
adopted its constitution a year later; Mauritania adopted its constitution immediately after independence in 1961).
2) Some constitutions were adopted before independence, such as the Lebanese one in 1926 (while Lebanon
gained independence on 22 November 1943). 3) Constitutions that were adopted because of new circumstances
such as that of Jordan in 1952, after the unification of the two banks of the river, and Iraq in 1968, after the Ba‘thi
revolution. 4) There are states with a special constitutional history such as Egypt, which enjoyed certain autonomy
within the Ottoman Empire, and began very early on, the codification process. Egypt was also familiar with
different constitutions. 5) Some systems are related to special circumstances such as Saudi Arabia, which has no
constitution but the Shari‘a; and Libya which has a Constitutional Proclamation – The Green Book and a popular
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the title of this paper may be suggesting – when dealing with Arab states, is at best irrelevant,
and at worse, counterproductive and misleading.28
The principle of popular sovereignty,29 or national sovereignty,30 is included in most Arab
constitutions that adopted written constitutions. While referring often to the people (or the
nation),31 as the holder of constituent power,32 the source of all powers,33 it is often stated that
the people exercise it through its representatives,34 or through referendum,35 through the
Proclamation. 6) There are Unitarian States such as Tunisia, and Federal States such as Sudan. 7) There are
different political systems such as constitutional royal hereditary (Jordan) and republican (Egypt). See ASEM KHALIL,
THE ENACTMENT OF CONSTITUENT POWER IN THE ARAB WORLD: THE PALESTINIAN CASE 157‐9 (PIFF Etudes et Colloques 47,
Fribourg, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2006). For more about constitutions in Arab countries, see: E. CANAL‐FORGUES,
‘RECUEIL DES CONSTITUTIONS DES PAYS ARABES’ (Bruxelles, Bruylant 2000). Other data are available at the website of the
Program of Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR): http://www.pogar.org/. Nathan Brown has produced many
scholarship of great relevance regarding Arab States constitutions. See Brown, supra note 21; Nathan Brown,
Constituting Palestine: The Effort of Writing a Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority 54 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 25, 25‐
43 (2000); NATHAN BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD (Albany, State University of New York Press
2002); NATHAN BROWN, PALESTINIAN POLITICS AFTER THE OSLO ACCORDS: RESUMING ARAB PALESTINE (Berkeley, University of
California Press 2003).
28

It is with this detail in mind that readers need to mitigate any seemingly generalizing conclusions I reach in the
following sections, with regards to what I refer to as ‘Arab world’ or ‘Arab states’. It is not my concern to define
what an Arab state is, or how a state can be considered an Arab state. It fits within this definition any State that
defines itself as such. For an issue of convenience, I will adopt the League of Arab States as criteria; accordingly, for
the purposes of this article, Arab states are those 22 states members of the Arab League. For more about the Arab
League and the membership, see: http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/categoryList.jsp?level_id=56
29

See, e.g., Article 3 of the Constitution of Egypt (1971, amendments until 2007); Article 1/D of the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Bahrain (February 14th, 2002); the Preamble (d) of the Constitution of Lebanon (1926, with all
amendments); Article 1 of the Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia (2004); Article 2 of the Constitution of Sudan
(2005); Article 2 of the Constitution of Syria (1973). For more about Arab Constitutions referred to in this and the
following footnotes, see the official page of POGAR (Program on Governance in the Arab Region):
http://www.pogar.org/resources/listlinks.aspx?lid=13
30

See, e.g. Article 6 of the Constitution of Algeria (1996, amended in 2002); Article 6 of the Constitution of Kuwait
(1962); Article 2 of the Constitution of Morocco (1996); Article 3 of the Constitution of Tunisia (2002).
31

See, e.g., the Constitution of Jordan (1952).

32

See, e.g., Article 7 of the Constitution of Algeria.

33

See, e.g., Article 3 of the Constitution of Egypt; Article 1/D of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain; Article
5 of the Constitution of Iraq (2005); Article 24 (i) of the Constitution of Jordan; Preamble (d) of the Constitution of
Lebanon; Article 2 of the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority; Article 59 of the Constitution of Qatar (2004);
Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (1994).
34

See, e.g., Article 7 of the Constitution of Algeria; Article 2 of the Constitution of Morocco; Article 1 of the
Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia; Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen.
35

See, e.g., Article 7 of the Constitution of Algeria; Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen.
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constitutional institutions,36 or in the way prescribed by the constitution.37 In some instances,
the supremacy or sovereignty of the law,38 or the constitution,39 is stated expressly.40
One may challenge the relevance of such constitutional provisions for two reasons at least.
First, despite the similarities in constitutional provisions, there is a gap in the Arab countries
between the law of the constitution (as a written text) and the ‘real constitution’. Second, such
constitutional provisions do not mean much in the absence of a democratic system, based on
the rule of law.41 Both objections insinuate that, in order to know more about the real
constitution, there is a need to read the constitutional text, in the light of the way power is
exercised in each and every Arab state. Those scholars who did that noticed, rightly, that this
part of the world is best described with the colorful title of Nathan Brown’s book (Constitutions
in a Nonconstitutional World).42
Admitting that these objections are correct – and I believe that this is largely the case – they are
not arguments that can be raised against Arab Constitutions alone. Such phenomena are
indeed present in other parts of the world. Historically speaking, “popular sovereignty” was
often invoked by authoritarian and totalitarian nationalists “to justify their demands for
extreme forms of national self‐assertion”.43 Most importantly, even in democracies, the people
are largely marginalized, and their role is limited to the one assigned by the constitution itself,
and the law in general. This means that the above objections, despite of the valid concerns they
raise, have only limited relevance for the point I defend here, i.e. the source of power in Arab
36

See, e.g., Article 5 of the Constitution of Iraq; Preamble (d) of the Constitution of Lebanon; Article 2 of the
Constitution of Morocco; Article 2 of the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority.
37

See, e.g., Article 24 (ii) of the Constitution of Jordan, Article 6 of the Constitution of Kuwait; Article 59 of the
Constitution of Qatar; Article 2 of the Constitution of Sudan; Article 2 of the Constitution of Syria.
38

See, e.g., Article 5 of the Constitution of Iraq; Article 2 of the Constitution of Morocco.

39

See, e.g., Article 2 of the Constitution of Morocco; Article 3 of the Constitution of Sudan.

40

There are some exceptions to this overall trend. This is the case, for example, of the Basic Law of Governance
(1992), which states in Article 7: “The authority of the regime is derived from the Holy Qur'an and the prophet's
Sunnah which rule over this and all other state laws.”
41

The rule of law, as a political ideal, means different things, and it is impossible to give an exhaustive definition of
that ideal, no body does. In this paper I connect constitutions with the rule of law. The former, indeed, is relevant
in that they enable the rule by law (i.e. the government itself subjects its will power to the constraints of the law)
as much as the rule through law (i.e. the ruler’s employment of the form of the law for his or her acts of
domination). Those are arguably the twofold meanings of the rule of law. UK Preuss, R. Bellamy, The political
meaning of constitutionalism Introduction: Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY:
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 11, 16 (R. Bellamy ed., Averbury, 1996).
42

See Brown, supra note 27.

43

B. Yack, Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism, 29 POLITICAL THEORY 517, 518 (2001).
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states, is not God nor the Holy Book of any particular religion, but rather lies in a humanly
established community, territorially defined, the reflection of the needs of its time, contingent
to immanent needs and will.
The fact that most Arab states, although largely undemocratic, adopt rigid constitutions, and
refer to the people as source of authority, proves the importance this principle for the
legitimacy of Arab states, in a way similar to other countries all over the world. Most
importantly, it is of particular relevance for the territorially defined Arab states, on the one
hand, to distinguish themselves from neighboring Arab states and peoples, although sharing
the same belonging to the Arab nation, and on the other, to accommodate religious and
sectarian diversities within its borders. Accordingly, despite being absented and marginalized
from the real affairs of the state, the reference to the ‘people’ in constitutional texts is relevant
for contemporary Arab states. It means that authority is exercised by human beings, on human
beings, and with the authority of human beings themselves. Most importantly, it means that
authority in contemporary Arab states is, by definition, exercised by secular, and not divine or
transcendental, power.44

III. SOVEREIGN TERRITORIAL STATES
Popular sovereignty as a theoretical principle may be embodied in most constitutions, but
sovereignty of the people, even in democracies, is only a slogan without real content.45 It is
being under the same law and institutions that makes of them one people as ‘demos’.46 The
people are not free to exercise direct power, but only through their representative
government. They may have a role to play in certain circumstances, but only if the constitution
permits that. Accordingly, the constitution, enacted by the constituent power, the prerogative
of the sovereign, frame the way the people, the governed, participate in deciding their own
destiny.47
44

As for the impact of the reference to Islam and Shari‘a, see text accompanying notes 86‐132.

45

“The people, in Maistre’s words, ‘are a sovereign that cannot exercise sovereignty’; the power they possess, it
would appear, can only be exercised through constitutional forms already established or in the process of being
established. This indicated what, in its most elementary formulation, might be called the paradox of
constitutionalism.” Loughlin and Walker, supra note 2, at 1.
46

For Sieyès, for example, the nation is a “body of associates living under common laws and represented by the
same legislative assembly.” Cited in: Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking of the New Polity: Some
deliberations between the Constituent Power and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND
LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 143, 149 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., Durham and London, Duke University Press
1994).
47

Even in the case of France, the ‘general will’, still influential and central in French constitutional tradition, is not
shaped directly by the people, but only in an indirect way, through the available constitutional institutions. In
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If it is not the people, then, who is the sovereign, whose will is embodied in the constitution?
What are the criteria to know which forms of government fit the needs of pre‐established
community, in order to accommodate the sovereign power in the state? Many answers are
theoretically possible; my suggestion is to consider the particular place the ‘state’ had in
modern societies. In the 19th century, indeed, attributing sovereignty to the state resolved a
struggle between those favoring the sovereignty of the monarch and those favoring popular
sovereignty. State sovereignty, as a compromise between both doctrines, gave the state the
central place it occupied, which lead to the denomination of Staatsrecht (the law of the state),
instead of Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law).48
It is the state, acquiring a personality, which is the new sovereign. This State‐Sovereign is
omnipresent and absolute in that it is no more one of the many forms political communities can
be shaped. It is The Form, almost the only one, central in both domestic and international law.
It is this State‐Sovereign that characterizes and distinguishes modern Arab states.49 It is the
state that is at the center of attention; its security, stability, and protection have priority over
whatever other objectives in the legal and political system. The state here is priceless and
everything else can be sacrificed. Although recognized as citizens, those are no more than
subjects on which the state exercise its authority, indiscreetly. It does not serve other
objectives, but the preservation of itself is the objective. It is absolute and knows no limits
whatsoever.
Such a state sees in the similarly evolving neighboring Arab states as a potential danger.50 The
result of this evolution is that Arab states are becoming increasingly entrenched and
naturalized.51 The oil phenomenon with the disparities in richness between Arab states serves
contemporary France, “the shaping of the general will depends on the executive and on the Constitutional Council
as well as on the legislature” (Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 13) (making reference to the contribution of: D.
Rousseau’s contribution to the volume he edited).
48

See A. V. Bogdandy, The past and promise of doctrinal constructivism: A strategy for responding to the challenges
facing constitutional scholarship in Europe, 7 INT.L J. CONST. L. 364, 385 (2009). For this reason constitutional
scholarship in Germany is as a separate discipline is almost always connected with German legal scholarship, in
particular, the so‐called positivist legal method of “state legal positivism ” (der staatsrechtliche Positivismus). See
id. at 372‐3.
49

According to Ghalioun, the state became at the core of the debate over nationalism : “L’épuisement du débat
sur l’identité a ouvert en grand… celui de l’Etat, sa nature, ses origines, ses stratégies et son avenir. Les analystes
dans ce domaine… n’ont jamais été systématiques dans le Monde Arabe. Et même si le débat sur la nation
continue à exister, son objet véritable n’est autre que l’Etat, dans sa morphologie ou dans les structures de ces
pouvoirs." GHALIOUN, supra note 7, at 53.
50
51

See Salamé, supra note 7, at 6.

There are good reasons also to believe that these internationally recognized countries have also taken root in
the hearts and minds of their inhabitants. See Salamé, supra note 7, at 3. For Korany: “The Arab territorial state is
becoming increasingly implanted and naturalised. It is not an indigenous phenomenon and yet it no longer seems a
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this purpose.52 Many newly established countries in the region (such as Kuwait and Qatar)
retain the word ‘State’ in their official name, as if their statehood was too vulnerable not to be
systematically reasserted. It also explains the Palestinians’ emotional investment in a state of
their own, and the Palestinian Authority insistence on symbols of the state (a flag, a passport, a
national anthem), despite lacking sovereignty, and without a detailed view of this potential
state in relation to the Palestinians as a people.53
In such a context, it appears completely ‘logical’ and ‘coherent’ that Arab states, which policies
are largely defined by the existent regimes, become increasingly suspicious of any transnational
movements that go beyond the rhetoric of Arab unity based on the existing sovereign Arab
states.54 Without undermining other possible reasons (historical, political, or legal), it is the
attachment to territorially defined states that explains best why most Arab states did not
recognize Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, and supported coalition (with other non‐Muslim and non‐
Arab countries) against Iraq, member of the Arab League, during the first Gulf War. This
explains also why Arab states are reticent towards permitting double Arab nationalities,
effectively banned in the Arab States55 (thus, reject the possibility of double Arab loyalties).
The paradox in the Arab world is the attachment to territorial states, related to ‘popular
sovereignty’ of each Arab people, i.e. territorially defined; at the same time other discourses
are used to legitimate state authority, including the reference to Arab nation and Islamic
umma.56 The gap between the discourse and the reality is clear. It is sometimes explained by
the dichotomy between indigenous political culture and the imported elitist culture.57 I argue
foreign import. It is thus a hybrid product. Though its form represented the primacy and globalisation of the
modern European political culture at the basis of the Westphalia inter‐state order, its content is increasingly
nationalised. Despite this contradiction between form and content, acceptance of it as ‘normal’ is growing. People
have become accustomed to its presence; it is now the order of the day, the standard frame of reference.” Korany,
supra note 7, at 72.
52

See Salamé, supra note 7, at 6‐7. The same author mentions the rise of the State of Israel as serving this same
objective.
53

See id. at 2.

54

This vision of the Arab world, based on currently existing Arab states, territorially defined, is at the center of the
Arab League. It is the principle of non‐interference in other states’ internal affairs and the respect of their
sovereignty, institutionalized in Article 8 of the Charter which characterizes the Arab League and maybe which
permitted its establishment after all, and the adherence of all Arab countries.
55

See BADIL, SURVEY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 2006‐2007 126 (Bethlehem, Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights 2007).
56
57

See text accompanying notes 57‐61.

“The gap between ‘said’ and ‘done’ is a reflection of a contradiction between indigenous grass‐roots political
culture (which is ‘pan’‐ or particularistic ethnic) and the imported élite culture, which emphasizes the nation‐state
as the frame of reference.” See Korany, supra note 7, at 49.
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that the gap is much deeper than the dichotomy elite‐indigenous. It is related to the identity of
each Arab people, as being part of the Arab nation – and, maybe, the Islamic nation – while at
the same time defending its territorially‐defined sovereignty. It is a dichotomy between a
people, historically, culturally and largely religiously defined, and a people of a particular state,
legally established. At least per regions (for example, the Fertile Crescent, Arabian Peninsula,
North African Arab Countries, the Maghreb countries), similarities are so evident that any
distinction based on ‘nationality’ is often difficult to defend, unless by making reference to the
law, which creates distinguished citizenships, strictly related to each state, territorially defined.

IV. NATIONALISM WITHOUT THE NATION
Nationalism may have rapidly invaded Arab mentality, as much as in many other parts of the
world, giving rise to territorially defined modern states. However, this invasion has not been
met with a clear definition of what exactly the nation is.58 The relation between Arab ‘nation’
and single Arab ‘people’ may not be well comprehended using concepts such as ‘nation’ and
‘people’.59 In fact, these two concepts have to be understood in the light of the wider concept
of the umma,60 which is often used to refer to Islamic community or the community of
58

See Salamé, supra note 7, at 4.

59

There is not one unique definition for the concept of nation, people and state. Actually, these terms are often
used as synonymous, while they are not. As an example of that confusion, we will mention the charter of the
United Nations. In fact, we read in its first beginning: “we the peoples of the United Nations…” while the
organization membership is limited to states. Peoples subjectivity, in fact is limited to the recognition of people’s
right to self‐determination, which is not interpreted pacifically, especially when it does mean the right to
statehood, since the United Nations is based on sovereignty of member states. Similar confusion occurs with the
Arabic terminology. The concept umma (translated as a nation) is used when it refers to Islamic and/or Arab
nation, while sha’b (translated as people) refers to single Arab peoples and dawla (translated as state) refers to the
territorial Arab states (dawla qutryya). The term dawla is relatively modern and refers to ruler’s (or dynasty of
rulers) administration in the recent past, similar to the concept of Sultanate in the Ottoman Empire. The concept of
ard or arady (territory or territories) refers to all the Arab territories as one unit or to the territory of single Arab
states, while the concept qutur refers only to the territory of a single state. In addition, the adjective of the word
‘nation’ (translated as ‘national’) is qawmiyya when it refers to the Arab nation, while it is wataniyya (also
translated as ‘national’) when it is related to the territorial Arab nationalism, also meaning patriotism. While the
concept of muwatana refers to the citizenship; this concept has its origin in watan that is homeland, although
sometimes it is used to refer to Arab land, alwatan al‐arabi! For more, see Khalil, supra note 27, at 86‐7.
60

In his book, Az‐Zahir fi ma’ani Kalimat an‐Nas, Ibn al‐Anbari notes that the term umma (nation) occurs in eight
different senses in Arabic. Some of these meanings are: a community or a group of people; a religion; time…
Besides, the terms nation (umma) and mother (umm) prove by virtue of their being derived from the same
linguistic root, that ‘nation’ is an extension of one’s family – indeed it is the bond of brotherhood par excellence. ‘A
nation is a uterine experience’, says al‐Arsuzi, meaning that it is an extension of foetal life. In the al‐muheit
dictionary the term umma means a group of people (nas) united by common land, language, tradition, interests,
emotions and aspirations; Accordingly, the Arabs would be considered as one complete umma although they may
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believers (al‐umma al‐Islameyya) or to Arab nation (al‐umma al‐‘arabeyya). However, there is
no contemporary state that can pretend to incorporate one or both nations in one political
community. What we have right now is a multiplicity of territorially defined states.
For Arab nationalists, the (Arab) nation exists as a human group with its own characteristics,
such as language, history and traditions.61 This means that the reference to Arab nation as
cultural heritage does not exclude necessarily the support for political unity,62 but it is not
necessarily exhausted or limited to it. What is clear is that all attempts to (political) unity failed,
and Arab nationalism started to adapt and accommodate its ideology with the current Arab
territorial states.
If one admits that a culturally‐defined (or even ethnically‐shaped) nation, the Arab nation,
helped in the first instance to justify the revolution of the Arabs, or parts of the Arab
populations, against other Muslims, the Ottomans,63 how can we distinguish between Arab
populations, and the currently established territorial Arab states. What makes the Jordanian
different from the Palestinian, the Lebanese from the Syrian? As a consequence, adopting the
concept of nation as in demos is virtually indispensable. A nation is no more culturally or
religiously defined, but it holds together all those citizens who are living under same the law
and the same constitution, within the framework of the currently existing states.
Attractive as it may seem, the above construction is not convincing; simply because individuals
do not live in the abstract. They are individuals within a particular community. They have their
religion, their skin color, their language. They share a common history, experiences, and
tragedies. They have the same origin and homeland. They may feel, accordingly, affinities with
be distributed in different states, each holding its own political independence. In the al‐Ghany dictionary the term
umma means a group of people (nas) united by common historical liaisons that may be composed of language,
religion or the economy and have the same goals in their beliefs, the politics or in the economy. It is used to
indicate the Arabic umma and the Islamic umma. The same term is used in plural umam to indicate, for example
the United Nations. For more, see S. Bensaid, Al‐Watan and Al‐Umma in Contemporary Arab Use, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 149, 150‐167 (Gh Salamé ed., London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987).
61

According to Harik, this nation is based on the same unified high culture that was generated from language and
religion throughout the ages, which bequeathed a sense of collective identity. See Harik, supra note 7, at 20. Such
cultural dimension of Arab nation does not contradict necessarily with current particularities within Arab
populations. See GHALIOUN, supra note 7, at 38.
62

The urge for the establishment of one unified state for all Arabs, or at least good parts of them, is supported by
movements that adopt pan‐Arabist ideologies, largely unpopular in contemporary Arab states.
63

According to some authors, indeed, Arabs under Ottoman rule did not perceive themselves as subject of foreign
rulers. They identified with the Ottomans and looked upon the Sultan as the Muslim head of a Muslim
commonwealth of which they were a part. See Harik, supra note 7, at 35. For Bensaid it was the strong notion of
watan (homeland) that was used to justify the rebellion against Turkish occupation, even though the occupier
professed the same religion as the occupied. See Bensaid, supra note 60, at 153.
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certain groups rather than with others. This is what I refer to as ‘cultural heritage’; it has the
advantage of creating bounds that unite individuals, regardless – and sometimes despite – the
state itself. In this sense, individuals, although they may be sometimes stateless,64 are always
within a community, never as individuals alone.
As human beings, nations also have their history. Individuals are born and integrated within
that community, often without their own choice. A state may exist one day and may disappear
the next. Once created, however, the state is never the product of nothing, because
“nothingness” simply does not exist. It is always a state of a particular people who may have
their own history, language and culture.65 Most importantly, it is precisely this identity that
explains, justifies and pushes towards the independence, for those countries which were under
colonial regimes and occupation. It is precisely that distinctiveness from other nations that
pushes towards the assertion of national identity, and may lead to different forms of political
self‐expression, including the organization into a new state.

V. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRE‐ESTABLISHED IDENTITY
For a constitutional form to be sustainable, it needs to reflect this cultural heritage,66 and for a
“constitutional order” to work, it “must revolve around a predominant identity”.67 Constituent
64

This is the case right now of most Palestinians. In fact, half of the global Palestinian populations are stateless. R.
Hammami and P. Johnson, Equality with a Difference: Gender and Citizenship in Transitional Palestine, SOCIAL
POLITICS 314, 316 (1999). According to Shiblak, Palestinians, in fact, are the largest stateless community in the
world. The Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza Strip are de facto stateless since 1967, following Israeli occupation.
A. Shiblak, Stateless Palestinians 26 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 8‐9 (2006). The creation of the Palestinian Authority
(which is not a sovereign state) and the grant of a Travel Document did not change this reality. SEE A. KHALIL,
PALESTINIAN NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 27‐8, 34‐5 (Research Report
2007/08, Florence, European University Institute 2007). This was also the case, historically speaking, of other
‘culture nations’ such as the Polish Nation between 1795 and 1918. See Preuss, supra note 45, at 150.
65

As Michael Walzer puts it, when you "bring the people into political life... they arrive marching in tribal ranks and
orders, carrying with them their own language, historical memories, customs, beliefs, and commitments.” Quoted
in: Yack, supra note 43, at 518.
66

This seems similar to what Montesquieu meant when he observed that “the political and civil laws of each
nation... should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of
one nation can suit another.” CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8 (A. M. Cohier and
others eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989 (1748)), quoted in: Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional 108 Law Yale L. J. 1225, 1265 (1999). For Hegel too, a constitution is "the work of centuries.... the
consciousness of rationality so far as that consciousness is developed in a particular nation.” G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 286‐7 (T.M. Knox trans, Oxford Univ. Press 1942 (1821)), quoted in: Tushnet, supra, at 1269.
More recently, Mary Ann Glendon has promoted the idea that law "tells stories about the culture that helped to
shape it and which it in turn helps to shape.” MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 8 (1987),
quoted in: Tushnet, supra, at 1269. For Tushnet (supra, at 1269‐1285), those are examples of what can be called

2009]

FROM CONSTITUTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONALISM

19

power, accordingly, cannot be neutral to the particularities of each community, and the
constitution needs to relate to this cultural heritage.68 A people in this sense are a nation with
particular cultural heritage (i.e. people as ethnos as distinct from people as demos).69
The concept of nation determines the idea of state, its relation to individuals and the society in
general. It has, most importantly, serious consequences on the way ‘constituent power’ is
perceived, exercised and expressed. Here, two new questions arise. First, can a constitution be
regarded as legitimate only if it reflects a pre‐constitutional shared identity (cultural heritage,
or culture) or is the making of the constitution tantamount to the construction of ‘the people’?
The answer to this question appears simple, since both cases are theoretically possible. In
practice it will depend of the concerned country and the particular context in which the
constitution is enacted.70

‘expressivism’. “For the expressivist, constitutions emerge out of each nation's distinctive history and express its
distinctive character.” Id. at 1270. However, as pointed out by Tushnet, one “should distinguish between
constitutions with a small c, to which Montesquieu and Hegel referred, and documents like the U.S. Constitution.
The expressivist claim is plausible‐perhaps even tautological‐with respect to the former class. In contrast, nations
vary widely in the degree to which their written constitutions are organically connected to the nation's sense of
itself.” Id. at 1270. I agree with Tushnet distinction, but will argue, that even in the case of small c‐constitutions,
such as in many non‐Western societies, for long years under colonialism, do not necessarily reflect the culture of
the concerned people, but is often shaped by foreign, colonial and occupation wills. Such small c‐constitutions are
not genuine, and the large C‐Constitution may be willing, voluntarily to cut with the small c‐constitution.
67

Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 6.

68

In order that all the above makes sense, however, there should be a connection between three elements: the
sovereign, the constitution and the constitutional form. A constitution, limiting branches of government, is
intrinsically connected to the sovereign. A constitution does not necessarily limit the sovereign, because this does
not make sense (at least in terms of legality‐illegality); rather it enables his absence from day to day politics. The
constitutional from enables branches of government to exercise their power with authority, because they are
shaped and framed by the constitution, connected to the sovereign.
69

I refer to demos and ethnos in this paper in the same way used by Töpperwien: Demos (staatsvolk) refers to the
totality of citizens while ethnos (Volk) is a community based on the belief in a common descent or culture. N.
TÖPPERWIEN, NATION‐STATE AND NORMATIVE DIVERSITY 4‐5 (Bâle, Genève, Munich, Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2001). Preuss
distinguishes between two different conceptions of the nation, the French and the German (which is also the
concept of nation also present in Eastern Europe too). The French perceives the nation as “a rational and
deliberative community of citizens bound together by a social contract designed to implement the general will.”
While the German and Eastern Europe image of the nation as “as prepolitical community characterized by ethnic
homogeneity.” Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 18 (commenting on Preuss contribution to the volume he edited).
70

In the United States, the ‘nation’ and the ‘culture’ are not linked at all; culture is not relevant for the state
because it was not relevant for the nation. In France, things are different, the nation creates and defines the
culture; accordingly, the culture is relevant for the nation and for the state although it was not relevant for nation‐
building. In Germany, the culture defines the nation; consequently, the culture is relevant for the nation and the
state, and was already relevant for the nation‐building. According to Töpperwien: “The German nation excluded all
those who did not share the German culture. In the United States the exclusion of culture from politics was the
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The second question is, then, to know if there is any connection between the constitution and
the group with a pre‐established identity, the people (as ethnos), which is prior to the state
itself. To answer the second question, different options may be considered: First, there is no
connection at all between the two.71 This is the position of Hans Kelsen;72 with his legal
positivism, he resolves the paradox of what can be termed the question of ‘constitutional
legitimacy’ (i.e. legitimately adopted constitutions) by separating the legal from the political.73
This solution is simple and attractive but is largely unsatisfactory.74 Second, there is a direct
connection between the constitution and the people. How? There are different ways of
perceiving this connection:75 The first way of doing that is by identifying the (“We the People”)
only through the making of the constitution itself. In a sense, the essence of a people is in its
being represented and explicated in particular form by the process of constitution‐making itself.
The second way of perceiving the relationship between the people and the constitution is that
both simultaneously in a gradual and incremental manner. In sense, both the constitution and
the nation are related by the common future, which may one day be – but necessarily – a
present. In such a context, a state has primordial role in shaping both the constitution and the
nation. Finally, we can perceive the connection not as if the constitution creates the collectivity
but as is if it mirrors a pre‐political unity,76 while recognizing the pre‐constitutional exercise of a
homogeneous nation’s general will.
means that created national unity. France created the nation based on political will by creating an own national
culture and by suppressing divergent cultures.” Töpperwien, supra note 69, at 3.
71

For those who adopt this position, it is possible that they posit a pre‐legal event, something that Oklopcic calls a
“constitutional big bang” that can be a successful revolution, coup d’état, secession, or occupation. Such big bang
serves as an unquestioned point of departure for any subsequent constitutional theorizing.” Zoran Oklopcic, Book
Review: Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, eds., The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and
Constitutional Form, Oxford University Press, 2007, 375pp, 6 INT.L J. CONST. L. 358, 358 (2008).
72

For whom the “validity of the first constitution is the last presupposition, the final postulate, upon which the
validity of all the norms of our legal order depends” HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115 (A. Wedberg
trans., Clark, New Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange 2007 (1945)). For more, see: HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 201‐
5 (M. Knight trans., Clark, New Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange, 2009 (1967)).
73

H. LERNER, THE PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTION‐MAKING, LEGITIMACY, IDENTITY (Columbia University, April 30,
2004) 13. Available at: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/pdf‐files/apsa_lerner.pdf (accessed Jan 12, 2010).
74

Kelsen’s solution, is still a coherent one; it is however a solution as much as burying head in the sand when
something unpleasant is occurring may constitute a solution for an ostrich. In somehow, Kelsen resolves the
problem by negating it, by stating that it is not a legal issue, and that it is outside a juridical field. As noted by his
rival, Carl Schmitt, this radical distinction between the political and the legal prevented Kelsen, from providing a
satisfying account of the political dynamics of constitution‐making. See W. E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT: THE END OF
LAW (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Md 1999) 68; cited in: Lerner, supra note 73, at 13.
75
76

See Lerner, supra note 73, at 14.

In a sense, we resolve the problem of the authorship of the constitution by making reference to an imagined
pre‐political person (a thicker, historical people, this time ethnically conceived) that creates its own polity. See
Oklopcic, supra note 71, at 358.
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Constitutions, accordingly, are legitimate as much as they relate to the nation (whether
invented by it, developed side by side by it, or even reflected in it). The ‘nation’ or the
‘people’,77 whether conceptualized as a single entity (the nation or the people, for the French
post‐Revolution statesmen),78 or as a plurality (as conceived by the founders of the American
nation),79 is the author of the constitution. It is the creator of its constitutional order.80 A new
problem arises here, with regards to the identity of that people that constitutes the
constitution. One way out is to explain it by making reference to theories from outside the
juridical field, such as those of ‘social contracts’ and the ‘state of nature’.81
77

As outlined in different parts of this paper, there are different concepts of nation and people. For Sieyès,
however, they are synonymous. See Yack, supra note 43, at 533. The distinction between a ‘nation’ and a ‘people’
gives place to two different doctrines, largely influential in contemporary states, between ‘national sovereignty’
and ‘popular sovereignty’. Both doctrines are elaborated by Carré de Malberg ‐who maintains that they were
originally formulated in the era of the French. For Carré de Malberg every nondespotic state faces a choice
between national sovereignty and popular sovereignty. See Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional borrowing and political
theory, 1 INT.L J. CONST. L. 224, 227 (2003).
78

The French revolution gives rise to two related, but completely different doctrines: the popular sovereignty and
national sovereignty. While popular sovereignty refers to a people (conceived as a collectivity of individuals living
within a given territory) who can exercise sovereignty, directly or indirectly (through representatives), national
sovereignty refers to an abstract entity, the nation, which is composed, not only of individuals living at a given time
but also of members of past and future generations (thus implying the existence of general interests that
transcend the particular interests of living individuals). See id. at 227‐8.
79

As pointed out by Hannah Arendt, “[t]he word ‘people’ retained for [founders] the meaning of manyness, of the
endless variety of a multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality.” H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 83 (Penguin
Books, London 2006 (1963)).
80

The problem here is that one may go further in challenging the criteria through which one can determine the
identity of that “people”, and how it acquires its distinctive character as a single entity. Some constitutional
theorists have embraced a circular answer to this question: “Duncan Ivison, for example, has argued that the
“[c]onstitution constitutes the People who in turn constitute it.” In a similar vein, in the context of European
integration, Joseph Weiler has observed that “ [i]n many instances, constitutional doctrine presupposes the
existence of that which it creates: the demos which is called upon to accept the constitution is constituted, legally,
by that very constitution…”. Quoted in: Oklopcic, supra note 71, at 358.
81

Such theories, with high degree of articulation within the political theory try to explain the beginning of polities.
See id. at 358. Theories of ‘social contract’ at the origin of states, whether this contract is a real historical event or
an imagined one, provide an interesting account that merits further consideration. As rightly pointed out by
Nathan Brown, constitutionalism and constitution‐writing have been dominated by metaphors of collective self‐
definition: “a constitution is an attempt by a political community to express the fundamental rules and values of
political life.” Brown, supra note 21, at 47. However, there are different approaches to social contract. Venter
distinguishes at least three: 1) The British approach – which did not need a written constitution‐ emphasizes the
political self‐government of society through parliament. 2) The French approach – which had few scruples in
replacing its constitutions ‐ emphasizes the nation as it is manifested in the state. The American social contract
approach reflects the American concern with a society consisting of a multitude of individuals whose mutual
contract is contained in the Supreme Constitution.”F. Venter, Constitution Making and the Legitimacy of the
Constitution, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF INTEGRATION 10‐12 (Hague‐Boston, Kluwer Law International
1999).
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Without underestimating the relevance of questioning the identity of the people, by looking
backward in remote origins, we should rather ask ourselves a completely different question:82
What should we do with those who do not share the same cultural heritage of the nation? Can
the state use those differences to justify discrimination against them? Such attitude is
dangerous especially in contemporary states which are characterized by being multiple in terms
‘nations’, cultures, languages and ethnicities, that live within the same borders, as citizens of
the same state.83
The remaining problem is to understand if, and within which limits, the will of the nation shall
be applied by the state and reflected in the constitution. Is it sufficient that a nation wants
something for this will to be considered good? The problem of those who accept this option is
that the guiding political will lose all rationality.84 The paradox of constitutionalism is that the
82

There are different possible answers in contemporary constitutional and political theory to the question of
constituent power, at least four, as summarized by Loughlin and Walker: “(i) the juridical containment thesis,
whereby constituent power is exhausted by and absorbed within the settled constitutional form, as, for example,
in much contemporary liberal theory based on contractarian assumptions (e.g. Rawls); (ii) the co‐originality and
mutual articulation thesis, whereby the legally constituted power of the polity operates in productive tension with
a continuing background commitment to popular sovereignty (e.g. Habermas); (iii) the radical potentional thesis,
whereby constituent power is neither colonized by nor in symbiosis with the legal, but remains a latent
revolutionary possibility which lies behind and shadows the legally constituted authority of the polity (e.g. Negri);
and (iv) the irresolution thesis, which rejects the first two forms of accommodation, but also dismisses the
possibility of isolating the radical potential of constituent from the constituted forms of sovereign power, and
instead views constituent power as an irreducible supplement which irritates and challenges rather than
transcends the specific form of constituted power (e.g. Benjamin, Agamben).” Loughlin and Walker, supra note 2,
at 6‐7.
83

The constitution, alternatively, may provide a tool for creating this common element needed for the cohesion of
people of contemporary states. It serves to make all constituent groups and individuals feel that the state is their
own. They may not share common cultural heritage in the present; it is possible that they did not share a cultural
heritage in the past; most importantly, they may not be requested even to do so in the future. Despite all this, they
still identify themselves with that document, the constitution, in order to preserve the unity of the people, and the
cohesion of the state. In other words, the importance of the constitution lies not in its expression of pre‐
established political identity, but in its ability to transform it into a civic one. According to Preuss: “The constituent
power is simultaneously the creator of the constitution and the permanent threat to it. Yet, both functions are
necessary for the vitality of the constitution.” Preuss, supra note 46, at 164. Accordingly, “[w]hat matters is not the
pre‐constitutional shared –or unshared– identity, but the new political identity based on the constitution itself.”
Lerner, supra note 73, at 26. As pointed out by Preuss, “[t]he constitution, although created by the constituent
power, must always fight against the tendency of its own creator to infuse pre‐political elements into the
structures of politics.” Preuss, supra note 46, at 148. In a sense, “[t]he constitution gives birth to the people in the
”
sense in which this notion has been developed for the concept of democracy that is in the sense of the demos. U.
K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 19 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.,
Humanities Press 1995); quoted in: Lerner, supra note 73, at 26.
84

I refer to rationality in general terms, but I have in mind Max Weber’s distinction between ‘formally’ rational and
irrational, and ‘substantively’ rational and irrational. Although originally formulated to describe the economic
actions (where formal rationality refers to ‘abstract calculability’ while ‘substantive rationality’ refers to ultimate
values and needs), Weber’s insight may be of help for legal thought. S. M. Feldman, An Interpretation of Max
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legitimacy of the constitution is no more dependent on national preferences. It gives human
beings, again, the control of their destiny.85 But this time against possible societal dynamics,
often out of rational control. Such dynamics may develop throughout history serving interests
of particular groups on the demise of others. This is for example the case of women in various
societies or religious minorities in particular cultures.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCE TO ISLAM AND SHARI‘A
It is most challenging to understand the meaning of the reference to Shari‘a in constitutional
texts. In fact, many Arab countries stated in their constitutional texts that Islam is the religion of
state,86 and that Shari‘a, ‘principles of Shari‘a’,87 or Islamic Jurisprudence,88 is a or the source of

Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
205, 205‐48 (1991). With this distinction in mind, my statement will be reformulated as follows: ‘lose formal
rationality’ because it will decreases predictability and increases dependency on ultimate values and needs of the
concerned community. This means also that, the opposite process is also unfortunate, because it means that law
becomes increasingly formally rational, without consideration of ultimate values and needs of the concerned
community. For Weber, this is dialectic between form (thus process) and substance is characteristic of modern
societies. It is, accordingly, inevitable and inescapable, an ‘iron cage’. See ib. at 229. If my understanding to the
contribution of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt to constitutional theory is correct, then for the former, the formal
rationality prevailed, while the latter, insisted on substantial rationality. Weber, on the contrary does not seem to
be interested in making a choice. For him, it seems, the issue is not ‘process’ or ‘substance; rather, it is about
recognizing the existence and the relevance of both.
85

In the words of Rosenfeld (commenting on Preuss contribution to the volume he edited): “The Constitutional
subject cannot do away with either ethnicist or demotic influence. Indeed, without the former, such a subject
would be reduced to a rootless abstraction devoid of life; without the latter, in contrast, such a subject would be
so blindly driven by prepolitical forces that it would be completely incapable of generating a genuine constitutional
order. As Preuss sees it, constitutionalism requires imposing restraints on the impulsive drive of ethos through the
deployment of institutional devices designed to control the influence of prepolitical forces on the shaping of
politics. The constitutional subject must therefore use constitution making as a means of subjugating ethos to
demos.” Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 18. In Preuss’s words, “it is the very rational of the constitution to transform
the unfathomable power of the ethos into responsible authority of the demos.” Quoted in: Id. at 18.
86

See, e.g., Article 2 of the Constitution of Algeria; Article 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain; Article 2
of the Constitution of Egypt; Article 2 of the Constitution of Jordan; Article 2 of the Constitution of Kuwait; Article 6
of the Constitution of Morocco; Article 1 of the Constitution of Tunisia; Article 7 of the Constitution of United Arab
Emirates (1971). Article 4 of the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority (2002, 2003 with all amendments) refers to
Islam as the “official religion in Palestine.”
87

See, e.g., Article 2 of the Constitution of Egypt.

88

See, e.g., Article 3 (par 2) of the Constitution of Syria.
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legislation.89 Some constitutions conditioned certain governmental offices, such as the office of
Presidency,90 or even the King,91 to be held by Muslims.92 Some constitutions excluded this
reference to Islam from possible future amendments,93 or refer to Islamic Shari‘a again when
constitutional provision of equality of women is made.94
The increasing reference to Shari‘a in Arab states’ constitutions is perplexing, for those who
perceive this phenomenon as an increasing islamization of current Arab states; for them, those
are the signs of the creation of an Islamic state, or at least the adoption of an Islamic form of
government. If this postulation is correct, I argue that the reference to Islam appears to be self‐
contradictory, at least for two reasons:
First, in Islam, nationalities cannot separate between Muslim believers. An Islamic state95 does
not accept intra‐Muslim borders. Most importantly, the Islamic umma is not defined
89

Examples of reference to Shari‘a as a source of legislation are: Article 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Bahrain; Article 2 of the Constitution of Kuwait; Article 7 of the Constitution of United Arab Emirates (1971); Article
3(2) of the Constitution of Syria. The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority (2002, 2003 with all amendments)
refers in Article 4 to “principles of Islamic Shari‘a” and states that they shall be a principal source of legislation”. An
example of the reference to Shari‘a as the source of legislation: Article 2 of the Constitution of Egypt. This article
was originally similar to previous constitutional provisions (referring to the Shari‘a as a source). B. Dupret, A Return
to the Shari‘a? Egyptian Judges and the Refernce to Islam, in THE SHARI‘A IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
AND EGYPT ‐ IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW 161, 163 (N. Yassari ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2005). This article was
amended in 1980 by a popular referendum A. O. Sherif, Constitutions of Arab Countries and the Position of the
Shari‘a, in THE SHARI‘A IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND EGYPT ‐ IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW 155, 158 (N.
Yassari ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2005). Interestingly, Article 3 states that “sovereignty is for the people”
remained as it is.
90

See, e.g., Article 73 of the Constitution of Algeria; Article 3 of the Constitution of Syria; Article 38 of the
Constitution of Tunisia.
91

See, e.g., Article 28 (e) of the Constitution of Jordan provides: “No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a
Moslem, mentally sound and born by a legitimate wife and of Moslem parents.” Similar provision exists in the
Constitution of Kuwait (Article 4(5)).
92

Even in those countries where such constitutional provisions do not exist (accordingly, there is no constitutional
obstacles towards the arrival of non‐Muslims to high offices in the state, mainly the presidency), non‐Muslims are
excluded de facto from holding those positions, in different ways. First, in hereditary Kingdoms or Emirates, the
position of head of state is not open for others from outside the reigning families, which are all Muslim. Second, in
the Arab republics, where elections are held, the religion of the majority is Islam. This makes it difficult (but not
theoretically impossible), for a non‐Muslim to become a President. Third, while some constitutions condition
candidature for official positions to citizens, it is possible that nationality laws (whether codified or in the way they
are practiced) impose restrictions with regards to access to the nationality, to be limited to those who belong to
this or that Islamic confession.
93

See, e.g., Article 178 of the Constitution of Algeria; Article 106 of the Constitution of Morocco.

94

See, e.g., Article 11 of the Constitution of Egypt.

95

For more about ‘Islamic’ state, as distinguished from ‘Muslim State’, see supra note 163.
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territorially but rather by the community of the believers themselves.96 The reference to Islam
and Islamic law may be used also to reject the idea of states, territorially defined, and current
Arab states, as a whole.97 The challenge for those who advance such a vision is to justify their
accommodation within territorially defined states, and the way they deal with the non‐Muslim
communities, within Arab states, and to deal with inter‐Muslims differences (most importantly,
between Shiites and Sunnis).
Second, according to Islamic law sovereignty belongs to God: no state has the right to exercise
authority except in subordination and in accordance to the Law revealed by God and his
prophet.98 But, if God is a source of authority, how come then we use positive law to grant
certain principles, which authority is based on divine origin, the power of law?
If the reference to Islam and Shari‘a does not create per se an Islamic state, why then Arab
states refer to Shari‘a in their constitutions? (Notice that my concern here goes beyond the
explanation of why certain provisions have been included and why certain formulations were
preferred instead of others. Rather, the question I raise is related to the reasons behind such
reference itself.) When redacting their constitutions, why the overwhelming majority of Arab
states seem to prefer granting such primordial place to Shari‘a in their constitutions?
One of the possible ways to explain this phenomenon is cultural and religious particularities of
each nation that justifies and explains such reference.99 In fact, some provisions present in
96

As Hasan al‐Banna, the spiritual father of the Muslim Brothers, puts it: “Islam does not recognize geographical
frontiers and does not take into account racial differences. On the contrary, it considers all the Muslims as one
umma and regards all Muslim countries as one watan, regardless of the distance and boundaries which separate
them.” Bensaid, supra note 60, at 171. According to Sayyed Qutb, “the fatherland of a Muslim ceased to be a
portion of land. Instead, his watan became the home of Islam, the land in which Islam and Islamic law are the sole
authority.” He then concludes: “Muslim’s watan is not a piece of land, and his nationality is not that of a
”
government. Quoted in: Id. at 172‐3 (emphasis omitted).
97

Olivier Roy distinguishes between Islamic movements, increasingly nationalized, and radicalism, which is by
definition de‐territorialized: "C’est par l’inscription de leur action politique dans le cadre territorial de l’État‐nation
que les mouvements islamistes sont devenus nationalistes, ou du moins se sont nationalisés, à l’encontre de leur
idéologie d’origine, qui se voulait internationaliste. En ce sens les grands mouvements islamistes ont été des
facteurs de renforcement de l’État‐nation et se retrouvent aujourd’hui proches des nationalistes laïcs dans leur
opposition aux États‐Unis. À l’inverse, le radicalisme violent est le propre de mouvements dé‐territorialisés,
comme al Qaïda." O. Roy, Islamisme et nationalisme 104 POUVOIRS 45, 53 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
98

The Pakistani el‐Maududi (the founder of the Jamaat‐e‐Islami in Pakistan) invented then a new concept “al‐
hakemmeyya” that means sovereignty in reference to God, while seyyada (translated also by sovereignty) refers to
the people’s power. For Abul Ala Maududi (1903‐1979) sovereignty belongs to God; accordingly, an ‘Islamic state’
has no right to exercise authority except in subordination and in accordance to the Law revealed by God and his
Prophet. M. M. SHARIF, A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 656 (Pakistan, 1963‐1966).
99

The reference to Islam and Shari‘a in Arab countries may be a way to distance the new regime from the (until
yesterday‐) colonizer, thus, the assertion of a specific cultural, political and legal identity. The constitution‐making
itself may subscribe to that same objective. Adel Omar Sherif, for example, writes: “Egypt issued a constitution in
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constitutional texts support such a vision of Islam as ‘cultural heritage’,100 or as ‘moral
values’.101 In this sense, they may be even shared by non‐Muslim citizens, because being
‘Islamic’ is no more something religious, but moral, ethical and cultural.102 If this interpretation
is correct, then the different ways constitutional texts refer to Islam and Shari‘a is not an
issue,103 or at least, it is not the main issue, since the supremacy of the constitution, and the
guarantees for equal treatment of citizens, as much as the normative character of statute
law,104 are not shackled by such constitutional reference to Islam and Shari‘a.
I have argued elsewhere,105 that the reference to Islam and Shari‘a in a constitutional text does
not create per se a religious or an Islamic state.106 It may simply mean that, even in a secular
1956 to distance itself from the British. Islam was declared the religion of the state[.]” Sherif, supra note 89, at 157
(emphasis added). The same author makes a connection between the British involvement in the drafting of the
constitutions of Jordan and Iraq, under mandate, and the absence of a reference to “God” or “God’s laws”. He
insists that: “[O]ur adherence to Islamic law is important to our interactions with each other and with the
international community. Based on the dictates of Islam, our national character is distinctive among the nations of
the world[.]” Sherif, supra note 89, at 159.
100

See, e.g., Article 6 of the Constitution of Bahrain.

101

See, e.g., Article 9 of the Constitution of Algeria.

102

For some, it is possible even to conceive Shari‘a itself as ethics rather than as law; in fact, human actions are
assigned one of the five “Shari‘a values” or ahkam: (required, recommended, indifferent, disapproved, and
forbidden). Most interestingly, but also arguably, “postcolonial legal institutions have utterly changed the Muslim’s
relationship to shari‘a, both by codifying the law and by replacing shari‘a courts.” J. Brockopp, Shari‘a, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 619 (Richard C. Martin ed., Vol. 2, Macmillan Reference USA, New York
2004) (emphasis omitted).
103

The fact that most constitutional texts refer to Shari‘a as source legislation, not as source of law, supports this
interpretation of Islam as cultural heritage. In fact, in civil law issues, it is possible in many Arab countries to refer
to Shari‘a expressly as auxiliary source of law (not of legislation, with completely different results). This is the case
in Egypt for example. The Egyptian Civil Code of 1949 stipulates (in its Article 875) that ‘in the absence of an
applicable legal provision’, the competence of the judge to give a ruling according to custom, and, in its absence,
according to the principles of the Shari‘a. See Dupret, supra note 89, at 163. But even in this case, it is the judge
who will decide which principle of Shari‘a to apply in the specific case, in the absence of legal provision, and even
custom.
104

While reviewing various rulings of Egyptian judges, Dupret, concluded “[s]tatute law, then, does not seem
overly disturbed by references made to Islam and to its normative provisions, as long as these references are not
made to challenge its validity and/or to require its subordination to an order external to it.” Dupret, supra note 89,
at 165.
105

Asem Khalil, Constitution‐Making and State‐Building: Redefining the Palestinian Nation, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY (R. Grote and T. Röder eds., Oxford University Press, Oxford
Forthcoming 2010).
106

Taqi ad‐Din an‐Nabhani (1908‐1977) founded a political party in 1952 in the true sense of the word aiming at
establishing an ‘Islamic state’, restoring the Caliphate and declaring unrelenting war against all established political
systems in the Arab world. The party was called Hizb al‐Tahrir al‐Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party). Islamic rule,
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state, religion may not be totally absent from public affairs. Accordingly, the reference to Islam
in the constitution should not create any unnecessary perplexities. Such interpretation of the
constitutional reference to Islam and Shari‘a is more concerned with constitutional mechanisms
aiming at protecting individuals’ and minorities’ rights. According to this interpretation, the fact
that constitutions refer to Islam, means indirectly but definitively, that Shari‘a is confined to the
remit of positive law, as expressed in a legislative text issued by state authorities.107 In other
words, the binding character of the Shari‘a in the above sense is nothing other than the free will
of human authority. The empowerment of Shari‘a, through the constitutional texts, means that
a ‘secular will’ not a ‘divine will’ is at the origin of its legal character. Accordingly, it is on the
light of “sovereignty is for the people”, existent in Constitutions of most Arab states, that the
recognition of Islam as the religion of state and of Shari‘a as “source of legislation” needs to be
interpreted.108 This is particularly true in the absence of a religious authority competent to
in an‐Nabhani’s opinion, rests on the following bases: 1) the predominance of Islamic law; 2) the government
should be by the people; 3) people’s obligation to instate one Caliph for all Muslims, as their representative in
government; 4) people have the right to ijtihad and to propose legal rulings required to deal with the problems of
everyday life. According to him, the pillars of the state are seven: shura, the head of state, the executive body
(assistants), the administrative apparatus, the rulers (wulat), the judiciary and the army. In his view, legislation is
only the competence of the Caliph and of the people; and therefore, the Caliph has to consult the people (shura is
an obligation). The council of shura –and this is new‐ is not appointed, but elected from people of different
regions. An‐Nabhani crystallised his position by proposing a constitution. The nation for him constitutes the
practical means on earth of putting Islam into effect, by scrutinizing and judging the ruler. The ideas of an‐Nabhani
affected Sayyid Qutb (1907‐1966) who was a member of the Egyptian Brotherhood, and began to concern himself
with the question of social justice in Islam. He distinguishes between pre‐Islamic (jahiliyya) and Islamic societies.
The first can never pursue solutions to their social problems because they are not ruled by Islam. Qutb refused
moderate solutions under the concept of Islamic law as a main source of legislation. This radical position is also
expressed by Yusuf al‐Qardawi who presents the ‘Islamic solution’: the establishment of an Islamic state based on
pure Islamic rule, which has in Islamic legislation its ‘one and only guide’ and ‘reference’ for all its rulings. See F.
Jadaane, Notions of the State in Contemporary Arab‐Islamic Writings, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 112, 132‐
9 (Gh Salamé ed., London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987).
107

In most Arab countries, indeed, Shari‘a is limited to issues of personal status, or to other civil issues, but it rarely
touches criminal, administrative or constitutional issues. Most importantly, the reference to Islam and Shari‘a does
not mean the establishment of an Islamic system of government.
108

Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Dr. Omer Adel Sherif, commented on
Egyptian constitution’s Article 2 (“…Islamic Jurisprudence [principles of Shari‘a] is the source of legislation) and
Article 3 (“Sovereignty is for the people alone and they are the source of authority”) as follows: “While sovereignty
remains with the people, the recognition of Islam as the religion of the state implies that the sovereignty of the
people is subject to the authority of God; that the authority of the people is a gift from God, and that they have
been appointed to execute and follow His will on earth.” Sherif, supra note 89, at 158. At first instance, Sherif
seems to adopt an opposite position of what I have defended so far; a careful reading, may suggest the complete
opposite. In fact, Sherif makes a precision; it is not an issue of the wording of the article, but, most importantly, it
is an issue of interpretation (not for religious clerk, but rather of the judiciary). For this reason, he argues that, the
“statement [that Islam is the religion of the state and that Shari‘a the principle source of legislation] must be
accompanied by judicial review.” Sherif, supra note 89, at 159. Accordingly, in the case of Egypt, Article 2 will
depend on the interpretation of the Supreme Constitutional Court. According to Sherif, there are three principles

28

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 02

determine what is and what is not part of Shari‘a, rather it is the competence of the state
authorities to determine that, each according to the competences determined by the
constitution itself.109 In this regard, countries with ‘judicial review’ accord the judiciary an
important role.110 This does not mean, however, that constitutional provisions are not relevant,
and that any constitutional provision will be just fine. Indeed, the current formulations (related
to Islam and Shari‘a) are open to many interpretations, which can and may be discriminatory
towards citizens who do not share same religious faith.111 Most importantly, judges may refer

that address the meaning of Shari‘a within the constitutional framework: “First, it is acknowledged that Art. 2
forms an integral organic unit with the rest of the constitution. No provision may overrule another; all provisions
must be interpreted in accordance with each other. Secondly, the constitutional obligation of the legislature to
adhere to the Shari‘a is prospective not retrospective in nature. The judiciary may invalidate post‐1981 laws that
are inconsistent with Shari‘a, but it may not invalidate laws that predate the proclamation of Art. 2. And thirdly, in
its application of the Shari‘a, the [Supreme Constitutional Court] must always distinguish between definite and
indefinite sources.” Sherif, supra note 89, at 158. The most important principle, and the most difficult to apply, is
the third one. In fact, “few attempts have been made to analyse the content of this reference and its methods”,
which make the situation far from being a “clear‐cut”. See Dupret, supra note 89, at 161. The question will be,
then, on who determine which principle of Shari‘a is definite and indefinite or what makes part of the principles of
Shari‘a and what does not? For Sherif, it is the Supreme Constitutional Court. See Sherif, supra note 89, at 158.
Easy to say, but in practice, the way references to Islam in Egyptian legal practices are done is complex. See Dupret,
supra note 89, at 161. It is true that “the government must ensure that the dictates of God triumph over the
desires of man”. Sherif, supra note 89, at 159. Still, it is the task of the government to do so, under the scrutiny of
the Supreme Constitutional Court. Summed up, it doesn’t seem to me that Sherif is telling a different story from
the one I do. For both of us, it is the state (the government, the legislature, the judiciary), not God or religious
clerk, who ultimately decide when and how to apply what within state legal system.
109

As in the rest of the world, the two available options are those of the President or the Judiciary. In Egypt for
example, this process of accommodating Shari‘a within the Egyptian legal system is done under the final scrutiny of
the Supreme Constitutional Court. In Algeria, the Constitution, while it establishes a Constitutional Council, creates
also Supreme Islamic Council, related to the President, with the task of providing opinions with regards to religious
precepts (Arts.171‐173). Similarly, in Egypt, the “public management of [Islam as religion of state] is the duty of the
Shaykh of al‐azhar, of the Muftī of the Republic.” Dupret, supra note 89, at 162 (emphasis omitted).
110

In Egypt for example, Dupret scrutinized the rulings of Egyptian judges, and distinguished four categories: (1)
‘the objectivation’, (2) the ‘instrumentalisation’, (3) the ‘overvalidation’, (4) the ‘invalidation’. “The first is made up
of rulings defining the content of Islam as a recognized and eventually privileged religion, or of the Shari‘a as a
legislative reference. In the second category are found arguments utilising Islam as a source of legislation for
rulings related first foremost to the institutional form of the state or to a specific conception of public order. The
third concerns the positive ratifying of rules of statute law whose wording is self‐sufficient in itself and so does not
explicitly justify the same kind of reference. Finally, fourth, category, there were certain judiciary rulings that went
as far as invalidating statute law in the name of the Shari‘a.” Dupret, supra note 89, at 164‐5.
111

Most Arab constitutions, in fact, refer to freedom of conscience, worship, or religious practice. This is the case
of the Constitution of Algeria (Art. 53), Bahrain (Art 22), Egypt (Art 46), Emirates (Art 32), Jordan (Art. 14), Kuwait
(Art. 35), Morocco (Art. 6), Syria (Art. 35), Tunisia (Art. 5), Palestinian Authority (Art. 4). However, they limit this
freedom to existing monotheistic religions or ‘recognized’ religions, and subordinate it – as much as many other
freedoms – to largely non‐defined ‘public order’ or other conditions; thus, distinguishing between ‘freedom of
thought’ and ‘freedom of worship’. As it is the case in Egypt, in a case related to wearing veil in public schools, the

2009]

FROM CONSTITUTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONALISM

29

to Shari‘a to justify their judgments, ending up by consecrating a single, unique public morality,
one that does not contradict with Shari‘a (or the judge’s understanding of what Shari‘a is)112,
even if in violation of individuals free choice and liberties (for both Muslims and non‐Muslims,
altogether).113
The argument of ‘cultural heritage’ and the argument related to Islam as ‘religion of the
majority’ is an attractive explanation for the reference to Islam and Shari‘a. In most Arab
constitutions, however, the people did not participate in the process of constitution‐making or
amendment. As already noted earlier, it is often the regimes in power that constitute the
constitutions, not the other way around. Why it is then attractive, for Arab regimes, to refer to
Islam and Shari‘a? The reasons behind such phenomenon ‐that some may refer to as a ‘return
to Islam’114 or ‘return to Shari‘a’115 or even ‘Islamic resurgence’116 ‐ go beyond the scope of this
paper. I suspect, however, that the insistence of the conformity of the state with Islam
increases with the decrease of alternative legitimating narratives.117 Islam is only one narrative
(within many others) that current regimes use to justify their authority.118 In other words,
“Court underlined that while the [freedom of thought] cannot be restricted, the [freedom of worship] can [be
restricted] for the sake of higher interests, such as public order and morality.” Id. at 173.
112

While doing so, the judge present his ruling as ethically, socially, and historically based. As pointed out by
Dupret: “A rule exists as the inclusion of an understanding that we feel in harmony with others.” Id. at 157
113

The variety of cases, in which a judge can refer to Shari‘a is interesting; it may extend to various domains and
fields. In Egypt, for example, this occurred in a case related to wearing veils in public schools, to refusing the title of
professor, on the grounds of attacking Islam and saying heretical things, and to authorizing for sex change
operations. See id. at 172‐8.
114

The ‘return to Shari‘a’ is being used rhetorically, even among Muslim intellectuals, focusing primarily on issues
of public dress and ritual conduct, but also invoking the idea of the Shari‘a as a total way of life. See Brockopp,
supra note 102, at 618.
115

See Dupret, supra note 89.

116

See J. O. Voll, Islam and Islamic, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 360, 360 (R. C. Martin ed., New
York, Macmillan Reference USA, 2004).
117

As pointed out by Vatikiotis the ruler can be justified as necessary for the perpetuation of the umma. People
are, accordingly, under the obligation of obedience, unless the ruler’s commands contradict God’s law. Vatikiotis (n
5) 34. If many Muslim theologians recommended the acceptance of the prevailing political power, whatever its
form, provided it was in the hands of a Muslim, it is mainly to avoid any discord between the Muslims (or fitna). B.
Botiveau, Contemporary reinterpretations of Islamic Law: The Case of Egypt, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW 261 (C. Mallat
ed., London, Graham & Trotman 1993).
118

For Sherif, “[t]he credibility of a system of government as such depends largely on its respect for the Shari‘a, as
it is very unlikely for its people to trust a government that does not respond to God. The people will not call for the
implementation of a constitution they do not believe in. they will not call for a balance of power in government
unless it is according to terms they believe in.” Sherif, supra note 89, at 159. I read this statement as supporting
the claim I make here, that reference to Islam and Shari‘a serves the regimes to get accepted, to get the law
implemented because deemed in conformity in popular beliefs.
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constitutional provisions are often used, by current regimes, as a ‘language’ or ‘codes’ to talk,
or communicate with, constituencies. The constitutions of Arab states refer to Islam and
Shari‘a, but they also refer to equality, rights and freedoms. They talk about citizenship and
democracy, limited government and accountability.119 Those constitutional provisions are
directed towards different constituencies. They serve different purposes. Those are different
pulses, going to different directions. However, they have one thing in common; they all serve
the current regimes to communicate with the various constituencies, whether in the local,
regional or international.
One thing is certain, however. In contemporary Arab states, the relation between religion and
state is becoming increasingly problematic.120 In fact, the advantage of Shari‘a is that you can
invoke it to support anything you want. The disadvantage is that everybody understands
that.121 Reference to Islam or to Shari‘a is often used, not to support current regimes, but to call
for rebellion against them.122 For many Islamist groups, the current Arab states are not Islamic
at all or, at least, not enough (seeing the current map of Arab and Muslim states, which are
territorially defined, it is maybe more correct to say that, for some fundamentalist groups,

119

It is also largely related to the syncretism in constitution making in the new era. In such constitutions, it is very
possible to find two extremely contradicting provisions in the same constitutional text. Syncretism in a sense does
not encourage reaching compromises (intended as half way between two extremes, where everybody gives up
something to reach a common ground), rather it encourages each influential group or individual to give up
something on the price of another, elsewhere (public space, here, is perceived as various parcels or fields) ending
up by having a collection of opposites in the same text. Such a syncretism is not to be intended as a synthesis but
rather as a collection of thesis and anti‐thesis in a very spontaneous and un‐reflected way. In such a context, no
provision is indispensable (many provisions on which there may be a disagreement simply disappear) while many
others can appear ‘from above,’ in one of the different stages of constitution‐ drafting, discussing, or even
endorsing. Such a situation pushes me to suspect that the only decision undertaken by the constitution‐framers is,
indeed, to avoid taking decisions, for the sake and for the only advantage of having a constitutional text as such.
120

For more about the concept of state in Arab‐Islamic writing, see Jadaane, supra note 106. For a summary, see
Khalil, supra note 27, at 120‐33.
121

I borrow the colorful critique of John Hart Ely against Natural law (cited in: Feldman, supra note 84, at 237), to
make a parallel critique to possible reference to Shari‘a in modern Arab states, conceived as a standard that
determines the binding character of (state‐positive) law (thus, Shari‘a in a sense play the role of that standard
which effectively determines whether a law is binding, thus, is law). For natural law theorists, indeed, “law is a
rational standard for conduct.” M. Murphy, Chapter 1: Natural Law Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 15, 15 (M. P. Golding and W. A. Edmundson eds., Blackwell Publishing, 2005). There may
be, in fact, different ways of conceiving that ‘standard’ (reference can be done to God or divinity, to human reason,
to the nature of things, or even to religious precepts). However, they all recognize that the binding character of the
law is not its being enacted by human authority, but by its conformity to that standard.
122

It is maybe the growing strength of fundamentalist Islam, rather than constitutional reference to Islam, which is
more perplexing. Such growth is a continuous reminder of the precarious status of the state system and secularist
trends. See Harik, supra note 7, at 20.
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those Arab states can never be Islamic enough).123 For many Islamist groups, the undemocratic
character of the state is not related to Islam or the culture.124 Rather, it is used by current
regimes to obstacle democratic popular will,125 and to suppress freedoms.126 Islamists, willing
to participate in the political process, are treated differently by Arab countries (which must first
to recognize political participation of all citizens, and reject monopartism – which is not always
the case): they can be allowed (but largely contained),127 banned,128 or even forced to exile.129

123

Islamic radicalism denounces the almost forgotten Islamic Shari‘a (see Botiveau, supra note 117, at 262) despite
the reference to Islam and to Shari‘a in constitutional texts.
124

Interestingly, Islamist movement seem more open to political systems developed in Western democracies. As
pointed out by Bensaid: “It is amazing to note that the Islamist attitude towards the European political model is
more open and positive than the pan‐Arab attitude. The latter rejects the Occident and refuses to import foreign
political notions that do not reflect the genuine authenticity which the Arab nation seeks to recover. Contrary to
this introverted attitude, the Islamist attitude is marked by openness and even willingness to borrow from the
Occident.” See Bensaid, supra note 60, at 169‐170. Hassan al‐Banna showed an interest to the principles that
direct a constitutional government since they correspond with Islam: “When one considers the principles that
guide the constitutional system of government, one finds that such principles aim to preserve in all its forms the
freedom of the individual citizen, to make rulers accountable for their actions to the people, and, finally, to delimit
the prerogatives of every single authoritative body. It will be clear to everyone that such basic principles
correspond perfectly to the teaching of Islam concerning the system of government. For this reason, Muslim
brothers consider that, of all the existing systems of government, the constitutional system is the form that best
suits Islam and Muslims.” Quoted in: Bensaid, supra note 60, 170.
This is not to argue that there was not also, within Islamic movement, some strong voices against “democracy” as a
Western, and hence “bad” product. M. Chibli, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 CASE W.
RES. J. INT.L L. 13, 44 (2006). This may lead some to conclude that there is incompatibility between Islam and
democracy. The issue of compatibility or incompatibility goes beyond our main concerns in this paper. One thing is
sure, however, as pointed out by Mallat: “This should leave us with the acknowledgement that the zero‐sum
debate on incompatibility or compatibility between Islam and democracy often interchangeable with "the West"‐
will remain active and unanswered for some time, until at least some of the political dust settles and a stable
political and economic course is reached in one or more Middle Eastern countries.” Chibli, supra, at 45.
125

Many suspect that the ‘resurgence’ of ‘political’ Islam is the most salient features of contemporary Middle
Eastern politics. However, this political Islam is not necessarily a replacement for secular nationalism, rather it is an
integral component of personal and collective identity that has been ignored, suppressed and crudely manipulated
by the state. D. F. Eickelmm, Changing perceptions of state authority: Morocco, Egypt and Oman, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 177, 200 (Gh Salamé ed., London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987).
126

See Bensaid, supra note 60, at 168.

127

This is the case of Morocco and Jordan N. BROWN, A. HAMZAWY and M. OTTAWAY, ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: EXPLORING THE GREY ZONES 5 (Middle East Series: Carnegie Papers; number 67,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Herbert‐Quandt‐Stiftung, 2007). and
128

This is still the case of Egypt. See BROWN, HAMZAWY and OTTAWAY, supra note 127, at 5.

129

This is the case of Algeria, Tunisia and Syria. See BROWN, HAMZAWY and OTTAWAY, supra note 127, at 5, 7.
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In certain cases, elections in which ‘Islamists’ or pro‐Islamists win elections are cancelled,130 or
may result in international condemnation and boycott.131 It is the rise of Islamist movements
which has become “a matter of great concern for secular Arabs and Western governments, who
are suspicious of their ultimate goals”.132

VII. ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Others take a different path, trying to show how the system of government which was
established since early Islam is, by definition, ‘constitutional’ or ‘constitutionalist’, in that the
normative content of Shari‘a played the limitative role towards the governmental power. This is
why it is possible even to talk about “Islamic Constitutionalism”.133 For Sherif, “[t]he adherence
to Islamic law is important to our ability to limit the powers of the government. No man or
governing body should retain absolute power. A strong constitution based on Islamic norms
ensures that they will not.”134 For both, Islamic constitutionalism has something in common
with ‘constitutionalism’ in the way applied and interpreted in western democracies: a limited
government.
130

This is what happened when Islamist realized a victory in the 1991 Algerian elections, and later on cancelled.
See BROWN, HAMZAWY and OTTAWAY, supra note 127, at 17.
131

This is the case for Hamas (in the occupied Palestinian territory) and Hizbollah (in Lebanon) who to turned to
ballot box. See BROWN, HAMZAWY and OTTAWAY, supra note 127, at 12.
132

See BROWN, HAMZAWY and OTTAWAY, supra note 127, at 5.

133

See, e.g., S.A. Arjomand, Islamic Constitutionalism 3 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 115 (2007);

Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering, 16 INDIANA JOURNAL
OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 85 (2009); Intisar A. Rabb, "We The Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 527 (2008);
Nathan Brown, Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM 491
(Eugene Cortan & Adel Omar Sherif eds., Kluwer Law International 1999); Nadirsyah Hosen, In Search of Islamic
Constitutionalism, 21 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (2004);
Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 202
(1990); Mark Gould, Islam, the Law, and The Sovereignty of God, 149 POLICY REVIEW 3 (2008); Azizah Y. al‐Hibri,
Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992);
Raja Bahlul, Chapter 15: Is Constitutionalism Compatible with Islam?, in THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY AND
CRITICISM 515 (P. Costa and D. Zolo eds., Netherlands, Springer 2007); Haider Ala Hamoudi, Dream Palaces of Law:
Western Constructions of the Muslim Legal World, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 803 (2009).
134

Sherif, supra note 89, at 159.
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It is true that, contrary to other concepts, such as the Rule of Law (translatable as hukm al‐
qanun) or Etat de droit – Rechtsstaat (translatable as dawlat al‐qanun), there are no equivalent
Arabic terms to ‘constitutionalism’.135 While it is not exclusively the case of Arabic language and
culture,136 the absence of an equivalent terminology, “need not mean that Arab‐Islamic political
thought does not know what constitutionalism means, or that it is conceptually unequipped to
deal with the issues that constitutionalism addresses. On the contrary, a concern with ruling in
accordance with the law, the people’s right to oppose unjust rule, liberties which rulers are not
permitted to infringe, have existed in Arab‐Islamic political thought since the earliest times.”137
According to this interpretation, constitutionalism as such does not contradict with Arab and
Islamic legal culture and their philosophical foundations.138 It is not constitutionalism as limited
government that is problematic; on the contrary; limiting the government by making a
reference to a superior normative order that goes beyond the state is completely coherent with
Arab and Islamic culture. Instead, it is often the case that the obstacles towards limited
government can be found in the existing Arab regimes themselves, which show different
degrees of reticence towards transition to democracy. Even the reference to Islam and Shari‘a
in most constitutions of Arab states can be cited as an example of subscribing Arab states to the
principle of ‘limited government’ (some have even called this, ‘Islamic constitutionalism’).
The ‘problem’ with modern constitutionalism139 is that it goes beyond the ‘limited government’.
It includes also two other elements: the adherence to the rule of law and the protection of
human rights. The problem with such two elements, as part of that normative order limiting the
government, is that they may (and effectively they often do) compete with other normative
orders in Arab states. A clash may occur when certain rights are violated, based on that
normative (largely religious, but also historically and culturally contingent) framework, referred
to with the very generic term of Shari‘a. Two examples, often cited, are of real concerns for
individuals living in many Arab and Islamic countries: religious minorities and women.140 In a
135

See Bahlul, supra note 133, at 515.

136

This is also the case in Japan for example, where the concept of constitutionalism is unknown. See Hasebe,
supra note 77, at 240.
137

See Bahlul, supra note 133, at 515.

138

In an earlier study, I showed how Arabic and Islamic philosophies (such as those that can be traced in Ibn
Khaldun and Al‐Farabi) may subscribe easily to what is now called constitutionalism. see Khalil, supra note 27, at
148‐57; Asem Khalil, The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World, ANCILLA IURIS (ANCHI.CH) 88, 95‐97
(2006).
139

As pointed out by Rosenfeld, “[t]here appears to be no accepted definition of constitutionalism but, in the
broadest terms, modern constitutionalism requires imposing limits on the powers of government, adherence to
the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights.” Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 3.
140

This explains why many Arab states expressed their reserves on many international conventions related to
Human Rights, with regards to articles related to freedom of thought, and women’s rights, often with express
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sense, “equality is inextricably linked to modern constitutionalism”,141 that it is impossible to
perceive (modern) constitutionalism without it.142 It is by this equality component, that
constitutionalism becomes, not a limitation to democracy, but rather, its enhancement,
accomplishment and realization.
For minorities and women’s rights, the reference is often made to human rights, as defined by
international law. They are perceived to be universal, not dependent on (cultural, social,
historical or religious) contingencies of each state, taken individually. But, what if certain
interpretations of Shari‘a are used to discriminate against religious minorities, or against
women? What if Shari‘a is defined and interpreted in a way to be fundamentally contradicting
with religious freedom and women’s rights? Without arguing that Shari‘a is effectively
contradicting religious minorities’ and women’s rights,143 the issue is: ‘what if’? What would be

reference to shari‘a. See e.g. reservations expressed by many Arab countries who have ratified Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979): Egypt expressed reservations on articles 2 and
16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979). On the same
convention, Saudi Arabia expressed similar reservation, but in general terms: “In case of contradiction between
any term of the Convention and the norms of islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the
contradictory terms of the Convention.” Similar general reservation is also done by Morocco and Oman. There are
however some signals of change of attitudes. In 2008 and in 2009 for example Egypt and Algeria notified
respectively the Secretary‐General that they had decided to withdraw the reservation in respect to Art. 9(2),
related to granting to women of equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children. For more
about the status of ratification and the reservations expressed by member states, see:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV‐8&chapter=4&lang=en#2
141

Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 8.

142

It is true, that historically speaking, constitutionalism arose and gained credence during the formation of the
modern European State, and it is true also that it was really ‘constitutionalism’ in that it has the fundamental aim
of the limitation of power as a means of establishing guarantees. However, as pointed out by Fioravanti “it was a
stage in the history of constitutionalism that had not yet acquired awareness of a dimension that would later prove
to be decisive, namely the principle of equality. Therefore its limits were not designed to protect individual rights
attributed to subjects assumed to be equal to one another, as in the modern paradigm of natural law, but rather
they aimed to protect certain aspects of freedom and independence that were essentially of a corporativist nature,
centering around the guilds of a given city or of other territorial bodies.”
Maurizio Fioravanti, Chapter 7: Constitutionalism, in A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence 263,
263 (Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi and Hasso Hofmann eds., Springer Netherlands, 2009) (Italics in original). This
means that, even in the case of talk about ‘Islamic Constitutionalism’ in the sense of having a limited government
(while the limits reside in Shari‘a) is ‘constitutionalism’ for sure, but it is certain that it is not ‘constitutionalism’
that we mean in this paper, and that constitute a challenge for contemporary states.
143

This is not my concern here; however, many scholars asserted that it was historically so, and is actually so in
some contemporary Arab states. See, e.g., A. Emon, The Limits of Constitutionalism in the Muslim World: History
and Identity in Islamic Law, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accomodation? 258 (S.
Choudhry ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008).
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the normative framework that is limiting the government?144 Some scholars are even skeptical
about the mere possibility of accommodating ‘constitutionalism’ in the Muslim world.145
The discussion here may lead us to another; a discussion, becoming almost classical, in
international law and human rights law; what is universal and what is particular.146 In
constitutional theory, the discussion would be different too, as much as the questions we pose;
the issue is not whether or not we need constitutionalism (there is general agreement that we
do), the issue is rather which ‘constitutionalism’ (Western, Islamic, or Asian? Liberal, social, or
socialist?). Here, constitutionalism is not perceived as universally shared principles; instead, it is
a culturally, ethnically and religiously defined principle. The advantage of this way of perceiving
constitutionalism is that it makes us agree on constitutionalism and resolve the ‘paradox’; the
disadvantage is that the content of agreement is disagreement itself, rendering
constitutionalism in reality void of its content and sense; a content that justified the interest
showed in constitutional theory for constitutionalism, and its attractiveness as a normative
order, limiting states’ sovereignty.

VIII. RELOCATING DISCUSSION ON MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The paradox of modern constitutionalism is not in having a limited government (as constituted
powers), nor a limited people (as demos), but rather a limited constituent power, i.e. imposing
legal limits on the sovereign to will as it likes. It is this re‐introduction of the sovereign, whoever
and whatever is, in the domain of legality that constitutes a paradox. Although it may appear a
contradiction (how is it possible to introduce the sovereign to the restrains of the law, without
losing their character as sovereign?) The argument I will defend in this section is that, in order
to understand modern constitutionalism, in which human rights and equality is an
indispensable pillars, there is a need to discuss the issue from the perspective of the theory of

144

I have already dealt with the issue of pre‐established identity, whether ethnic, cultural, etc. I do not see why it
should not be applied here too. In fact, religious identity may have played a determinant role in building a common
national identity, and enhance national cohesion. Once a state is established, it should not be used against those
who do not share this religious commonality.
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See, e.g., Emon, supra note 143, in which the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are considered, regarding
religious freedom.
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See, e.g., M. Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A
Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249 (1999); E. Reichert, Human
Rights: An Examination of Universalism and Cultural Relativism, 22 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL WELFARE 23
(2006); A. E. Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Women’s Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern
Experience, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 176 (J. Peters and A. Wolper eds.,
London, Routledge 1995).
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state, not from the perspective of cultural or religious particularity of each nation. Such a
theory needs to be read on the light of the new realities in which contemporary states are in.
The new realities I am referring to are those that resulted from the atrocities of the Second
World War and the subsequent changes in international law and domestic laws. It is true that
world system as much as domestic law systems remained largely state‐centered. However, the
state is no more the same.147 The state, the sovereign, is no more outside legal constraints. The
sovereign, in other words, is re‐introduced in the domain of legality, where both international
law and domestic laws, largely codified in a constitution and constitutional mechanisms to
ensure that the sovereign himself act legally, while the state is no more the only and absolute
authority to determinate what is legal and what is illegal.148
In such a context, states and international organizations become central actors in the
constitution‐making for new states. This phenomenon ‐that some have referred to as the
“internationalization of the constituent power”,149 while means that the supreme and
sovereign act of constitution‐making (constituent power) is not exclusively a domestic issue.150
The examples of what is called sometimes ‘the internationalization of the constituent power’
147

As pointed out by Hamann and Fabri “It hardly seems necessary to point out that Westphalian sovereignty,
based on territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic institutions as sources of authority, has
eroded considerably. The concept of nation‐state sovereignty and its practical relevance are called into question by
the phenomena of internationalization and globalization, which challenge government and bring about new forms
of governance beyond the territorially defined state.”A. Hamann and H. R. Fabri, Transnational networks and
constitutionalism, 6 INT.L J. CONST. L. 481, 481 (2008).
148

Considering this “New Global Legal Order”, Baker argues: “The twentieth century has seen a fundamental shift
in the ways in which constitutions are understood. By the middle of the twentieth century, a new sort of
constitutionalism emerged, rejecting the idea of the legitimacy of every form of political self‐constitution. The
central assumptions of this new constitutionalism were grounded in the belief that not all constitutions were
legitimate, and that legitimate constitutions shared a number of universal common characteristics. These common
characteristics were both procedural (against arbitrary use of state power) and substantive (limiting the sorts of
policy choices states could make in constituting its government and exercising governance power). These
procedural and substantive norms were, in turn, an articulation of a “higher law” of the community of nations,
reflecting a global communal consensus evidenced in common practice or international agreements.” Backer, supra
note 133, at 85 (emphasis in origin).
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See Khalil, supra note 27; NICOLAS MAZIAU, LES CONSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONALISEES: ASPECTS THEORIQUES ET ESSAI DE
TYPOLOGIE
8
(Ecole
Doctorale
de
l’Université
de
Sienne
2002).
Available
at:
http://www.unisi.it/ricerca/dip/dir_eco/COMPARATO/maziau.doc (accessed on Jan 12, 2010).
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According to Thomas Franck, “[t]his is an irreversible evolution of international law: This newly emerging "law”‐
which requires democracy to validate governance ‐ is not merely the law of a particular state that, like the United
States under its Constitution, has imposed such a precondition on national governance. It is also becoming a
requirement of international law, applicable to all and implemented through global standards, with the help of
regional and international organizations.” Th. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46, 47 (1992).
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are multiple.151 In the Arab world, this was the case in Iraq,152 and largely the case of the
Palestinian Authority after Oslo, in its effort to write a Basic Law and a Draft Constitution for the
State.153
Many explanations are given for this phenomenon: the evolution of international law and
international society and the relations between states altered the notion of sovereignty; the
weakness of states in the third world and the multiplication of crisis situations and the will of
developed countries to act against these crises had led to the changing of the raison d’être of
peace‐ keeping and peace‐making operations.154 Most importantly, it is related to the
increasing number of states and the fact that the formation of most of them followed a conflict
situation. In such a context, the constitution is often connected to a peace treaty between new
neighbors, through which one can formalize a modus vivendi of various ethnic, national,
religious, linguistic groups that are ‘condemned’ to live in the same state.
In those cases, the involvement of international organizations and foreign countries in the
constitution‐making process of new born states is clear.155 Despite the fact that popular
151

It may be partial as a result of a treaty or an act of international law (Palestine, 1947, Namibia, 1990, Cambodia,
1991, Timor Leste, 2001, Macedonia, 2001), or as a result of de facto situation (post‐Second‐World‐War Germany,
Japan and Italy); it can be also total, where the elaboration process of the constitution is entirely left for
international order and where the constitution makes part of an international treaty (Trieste, 1947, Cyprus, 1960,
Bosnia‐Herzegovina, 1995, Kosovo, 2001). For more, see MAZIAU, supra note 149; Khalil, supra note 27, at 247‐63.
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For more about the Iraqi constitution‐making, see N. Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857
(2005); Brown, supra note 21, at 65‐6; Rabb, supra note 133.
153

As for the constitution making in the occupied Palestinian territory, it is a different story; in fact, there were two
different processes that have been taken place: drafting a Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority, and the
Constitution for the State of Palestine. For more about constitution making in the Palestinian case, see Khalil, supra
note 27; A. Al‐Qasem, Commentary on Draft Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority in the Transitional
Period, 7 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 187, (1992/1994); A. Al‐Qasem, The Draft Basic Law for the
Palestinian National Authority, in THE ARAB‐ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (E. Cotran and M. Chibli eds., London‐
The Hague‐Boston, 1997); N. H. Aruri and J. J. Caroll, A New Palestinian Charter, 23 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 5
(1994); Z. Hassan, The Palestinian Constitution and the Geneva Accord: The Prospects for Palestinian
Constitutionalism 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 897 (2004); F. Milhem, The Constitutional System of the Palestinian National
Authority, in CIVIC EDUCATION IN PALESTINE 117 (Ramallah, PASSIA 2006); A. Jarbawi, Constitutional Democracy:
Principles and Problems, in CIVIC EDUCATION IN PALESTINE 83 (Ramallah, PASSIA, 2006); Kh. Shikaki, The Peace Process,
National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine, 25 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 5 (1996); A.
K. Wing, The Palestinian Basic Law: Embryonic Constitutionalism, 31 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 383 (1999).
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See MAZIAU, supra note 149, at 3.

This involvement of international community in constitution making goes beyond the simple transplant,
borrowing, or imposition of legal texts. Such experience is much older than the Second World War, and is not
limited to constitutional texts. This involvement reflects the tendency to prioritize one form of government over
others, a system in which the individual human being, entitled to inalienable rights, has central place in that
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involvement, if any, is often marginalized to the moment of adoption or endorsement of the
constitution in toto, with the political and economic system it represents, constitution‐makers
often maintain the reference to the ‘We the People’. This is a ‘legal fiction’; a necessary one
though; for it is necessary to close the circle in the democratic account of constitution and law‐
making in a particular polity.156 The problem is that it no more a self‐constitution, in the way
the American and French revolutions may be suggesting. Instead, it is the constitution of a
pseudo‐self, completely detached from the collective which gave rise to this process, in the first
place. This distorted self‐constitution may not reflect a past that have never been a present;
however, it is largely directed towards the future that, at least as a theoretical possibility, may
never be a present.
The above analysis has the advantage of resolving the paradox, finally, in favor of the individual
human being, without discrimination based on sex, nationality, religion, or ethnicity. This
common human belonging is present in all mankind inevitably pushes towards rejection of the
particular and the support of the universal. It means also that it pushes towards one specific
form of government. Plurality is perceived as dangerous because it enhances differences rather
than common elements; different values rather than shared ones, different solutions rather
than common ones. We live in a globalized world;157 thus, we live in the era of globalized

system. As pointed out by Ackerman, “today, the whole world seems to be designing constitutional machines to
check and balance power in the name of human rights.” Ackerman, supra note 15, at 1800.
That individual holder of rights that go beyond the state, are shaping the constitutional form, although still largely
state‐centered, making it different although still the same. In such a context, constitutional forms acquire new
meaning, in which both constituent and constituted powers are limited by something else that goes beyond them,
exists before them, and may take a form outside both of them. It is that human being, its security, stability,
development and prosperity that acquires the place originally reserved for the sovereign. In such a context, the
state is no more perceived as the absolute authority but rather serves the objective the welfare of human beings.
156

This legal fiction is necessary to resolve the question of the legitimacy of those constitutions. The international
constituency continues to refer to the people and the nation in the text that is drafted and proposed for
consideration and adoption. According to M‐F. Labouz : “La fiction juridique par le mode de raisonnement dérivé
sur lequel elle s’appuie (…) remplit une fonction de légitimation idéologique (…) et traduit (…) le jeu des rapports
de puissance au sein de la Société internationale (…) on objectera peut‐être que seules les grandes puissances
peuvent user du procédé fictif avec quelque chance de succès et modeler ainsi la règle de droit à leur convenance
en la dotant d’une nouvelle positivité.” M‐F. LABOUZ, L’ONU ET LA COREE : RECHERCHES SUR LA FICTION EN DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 21, 314 (Paris, PUF 1980). Quoted in: MAZIAU, supra note 149, at 7. According to Chemillier‐
Gendreau : « La fiction est une technique (…) remplissant une certaine fonction dans le rapport de forces : elle
peut le consolider ou le renverser. » M. Chemillier‐Gendreau, Origine et rôle de la fiction en droit international
public, in ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 160 (Tome 32, Sirey, 1987). Quoted in: MAZIAU,
supra note 149, at 7.
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For more about the impact of what has been called “World Society” on nation‐states, see: J. Meyer and others,
World Society and the Nation State, in THE GLOBALIZATION READER 84 (F. J. Lechner and J. Boli eds., Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, 2004).
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constitutions.158 In such a context, similarities between constitutions, mainly the written
constitutions, are striking. This similarity is however misleading, and largely related to the way
new constitutions are drafted.159
The process described above as something that occurred following the Second World War is
not without negative aspects. This international interference in domestic affairs of states may
end up suffocating local aspirations. The way constitutions are drafted and imposed sometimes
prove that one can confuse the need for the constitutions and limited government for new
born states, with the imposition of a particular constitutional model: the liberal one.160 Here is
another paradox of constitutionalism in contemporary states that constitutional theory needs
to deal with,161 not from the perspective of public international law (which subordinates largely
158

It is in a sense a contradiction, why despite the globalization, differences, often of great measures, still exist
between various political systems and constitutional texts. It is also surprising how this globalization movement
often carries with it a movement that I may call ‘return to the origins’, insistence on cultural particularities, and
national exceptionalism. Those tendencies are maybe a reaction to ‘mondialization’, ‘universalization’ and
‘internationalization’, that can be summarized under ‘globalization’. This contradiction, I believe, is only apparent,
because globalization does not mean complete hegemony. In a different context, Go outlined that, “while the
norms or hegemonic assumptions of world society contributed to the fact that postcolonies adopted written
constitutions, particularities in any given constitution were shaped by subglobal (and yet not quite national)
registers: imperial, religious and ideological. The independence constitutions therefore reveal that if there was a
world society that determined constitutional construction, it was a society fractured internally by multiple scales of
influence. Constitutional models flowed intra‐imperially and, in the case of religion and Communism,
transnationally. No single constitutional model had reached the point of global dominance.” Go, supra note 14, at
97.
159

Scholars, interested in the constitutions adopted during the ‘new era of constitutionalism’ notice this
phenomenon of convergence and divergence that exist. They explain this by the way new constitutions are made;
they called it with specific names: ‘syncretism’ (See Go, supra note 14, at 104 ), ‘bricolage,’ (see Tushnet, supra
note 66, at 1285‐6), ‘gardening’ (e.g. R. R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed” Constitutions – Product of an East‐Central
European Constitutional Melting Pot 16 B. U. Int’l L. J. 1, 64 (1998)), ‘plagiarism’ (See LANE, supra note 20, at 196),
or ‘distortion’ (See Osiatynski, supra note 25, at 267).
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Rich countries for example may use subordinate their foreign and cooperation policy by the adherence of
newborn states and weak states to such a model. The risk here is to suffocate the local population, their
particularities and their culture. This may have a boomerang effect, with negative consequences on the efficiency
of the constitutional text, since the constitution may be considered as an ‘outside product’.
161

The paradox resides in the substitution of the national constituency by an international one. The
marginalization of the concerned people or nation, entitled, theoretically, to constituent power, leads to creating a
heteronymous constitution; an imposed constitution rather than voluntarily adopted, which leaves a question of
legitimacy of such enactments. In the international law, there is no paradox at all, but in constitutional law, this is
particularly problematic since the people do not participate effectively in the preparation and the adoption of such
a constitution, causing a setback regarding internal sovereignty of the state. Pierre‐Caps noticed that: « C’est
précisément (la) création radicale de la constitution, en vertu d’une décision du pouvoir constituant de la nation,
qui tend à être remise en cause aujourd’hui. Et, paradoxalement, cela tient aussi au succès rencontré par la
conception normative de la constitution. (…) En privant ainsi le pouvoir constituant de son caractère dynamique et
volontaire, et sans pour autant remettre en cause l’idée même du pouvoir constituant du peuple ou de la nation,
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national law to principles and norms of international law), but from the perspectives of
domestic public law.

IX. CONCLUSION
The constitutions of many Arab states are evolving; their political and legal systems are in a
continuous state of flux. They have undergone experiences, witnessed the world over; this
includes the way their identity is evolving, increasingly and definitively, around their territorially
defined state. Contemporary Arab states are – as much as other states – political rather than
religious entities; their authority is, by definition, dependent on the demotic concept of people,
largely defined by state positive law. Arab states are also increasingly interested in written
constitutions, because they provide a valid legitimating tool; most importantly, they are
increasingly attracted towards constitutionalism.
Regardless of whether human rights, rule of law, and democracy are compatible with Shari‘a as
such, or whether the argument of cultural and religious particularity is simply presented by
existing regimes to justify the lack of democracy and the deficiency in their human rights
protection record, the issue at stake is to determine what is ‘universal’ or universally valid, and
what can be ‘culturally contingent’. In my account, which is largely historical and descriptive‐
analytical, I perceive the development towards more protection of human rights (largely as a
reaction to the atrocities of states in Second World War) in both states’ legal systems, and in
international law, as favoring the thesis of universality. The way this protection is done, and on
which normative basis, is irrelevant as such. It can be international law or constitutional law,
but it can also be a religious normative order.
However, in case of contradiction between those normative orders (international and
constitutional law on the one side, and religious law on the other), and seen the impossibility of
determining in a definitive way, what makes part of that religious normative order, it is for state
authorities (again, secular not religious authorities) to make a choice. In fact, when an Arab
state opts for the religious normative order, it does not make reference to a unique and
commonly shared normative order, but rather it is the state itself that defines and shapes that
normative order. In this sense I discussed Shari‘a largely ‘confined to the remit of positive law’.
The issue, in my account, is not whether or not Arab states should conform to Shari‘a, as a
normative order, but whether or not the state, as sovereigns, can be re‐introduced within the
cette intrusion normative dans le pouvoir constituant laisse entrevoir la possibilité d’une constitution détachée de
son substrat national, désincarnée, ‘dénationalisée’ en un mot, pur engrenage de normes hiérarchisées… ». S.
Pierre‐Caps, Le constitutionnalisme et la nation, in LE NOUVEAU CONSTITUTIONNALISME, MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE GERARD
CONAC 72 (Economica, 2001). Quoted in: MAZIAU, supra note 149, at 6.
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domain of legality, and whether state‐positive law can be subordinated to a normative order
that goes beyond the positive law.
In this paper I have argued that this can be the case. There are also good reasons to believe that
it ought to be so. Many Arab states are under internal and external pressures and their stability
as states are at stake. I argue that one way out (and maybe the only one) is to evolve towards
constitutionalism, where legitimacy depends, not on the way a state or a regime is established,
but upon the way government is exercised. The stability of Arab states depends largely on their
legitimacy, and their legitimacy is dependent on the success of this evolution towards
constitutionalism. It may be true that only a few Arab states can be considered as indigenous
creations; most of them indeed did not develop as an indigenous and genuine product and their
borders may have been created artificially. Accordingly, they may have dubious origins, but
they can have a certain future; their identity will depend largely, not on what they were, but on
what they want to be. In such an identity, no one is excluded a priori, but no one has the
monopoly over the identity itself. A political system that incorporates such a vision is open to all
individuals (regardless of their sex, religion, or ethnicity) and to all parties, whether nationalist,
Islamist, or transnational, on the condition that there is an agreement over the need to
maintain the basis of the political process itself; that political process is, in the first place, what
gave them the opportunity to exist and to expose their needs, their views, and their wishes to
the public, not as mere private concerns but as public ones.
If the rejection of constitutionalism, as limited government, is the result of the reticence of
existing regimes, unwilling to realize a transition to democracy, resistance to modern
constitutionalism, as a normative order in which human rights are an integral part, goes beyond
the totalitarian regimes. It is indeed often the case that national, religious, historical or cultural
particularities are used as narratives to discredit modern constitutionalism; the latter being
considered essentially ‘Western’, not adapted for other cultures, such as the Arab‐Islamic
culture.
The question is, then, how can modern constitutionalism be attractive for an Arab state, if and
when such normative order clashes with religious and moral precepts of its population? Most
perplexing is the fact that most Arab constitutions refer to Shari‘a and Islam in their
constitution, thus giving it a kind of supremacy, entrenched by the same canonical constitution.
Isn’t it then that constitutionalism, which entails the subordination of the government to a
superior normative order, largely entrenched in a written constitution that will lead inevitably
to the rejection of any competing normative orders? Isn’t it in the name of constitutionalism
that modern constitutionalism can be rejected? In other words, modern constitutionalism
appears to be contradicting and competing with other available normative orders, within the
same legal system.
Nothing in what I advanced in this paper argues that modern constitutionalism contradicts
necessarily with a particular religion, morality, or culture in specific. At the same time, it does
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not exclude the possibility that modern constitutionalism may compete with the many existing
normative orders, that compete within the same legal system. On the contrary, there are
serious grounds to believe that it is often the case, not only in Islamic and Arab countries, but
also in Asian countries, as much as in Western countries. What this paper challenged is the
rejection of modern constitutionalism based on the historical, religious and cultural
particularities of each state. It is true that most prevalent concepts and principles related to
modern states, territorially defined, are largely formulated in the West, based on particular
historical experiences. It is also true however that similar path can be traced in other contexts,
including the Arab and Islamic history.162 However, it was not my concern in this paper to
conciliate modern constitutionalism with Arab and Islamic culture. It was not even my concern
to defend modern constitutionalism islamically, thus using arguments from within the shari‘a to
prove that modern constitutionalism (thus, human rights, democracy, rule of law, etc.) do not
contradict with Islam.
Rather, my argument is that the core problem is elsewhere. In my account, the issue at stake is
rather to be able to explain and justify why and how is it possible to limit states’ powers by a
superior normative order, in which human rights is an essential part? How can we still talk
about sovereign states, when those sovereigns are introduced to the domain of legality, and
when, at the same time, they do not monopolize the task of defining of what is legal and what
is illegal? Isn’t it the end of national states? Isn’t it a contradiction with states’ sovereignty and
superiority? Isn’t it a new kind of hegemony (colonialism, imperialism or whatever other
expression that can be found in the literature…) towards weak state exercised, exercised by
strong states?
Switching the discussion from cultural and religious exceptionalism to an issue of state
sovereignty has the advantage of relocating the discussion within the theory of state. Most
importantly, it has the advantage of avoiding a fallacy that resisting modern constitutionalism,
as normative order limiting sovereign states, is an exclusive concern of Arab or Islamic states.
Skepticism towards modern constitutionalism is indeed present elsewhere. Regardless of the
162

This is not to argue, however, that Arab states’ continuous research for constitutional legitimacy can only be
realized through a return to the past (whether to ethnic or religious identities, that go beyond all and each
concerned Arab states), but rather in their capacity to project a better future, arguing that legal/philosophical
revolutions, irrespective of the place of their formulation, are universally accepted and applied in contemporary
states, including Arab and Muslim states. We can distinguish between Islamic and Muslim state, used often
throughout this paper. The distinction only dates to the late twentieth century, in the context of what is called ‘the
Islamic resurgence’. Since then, some made a distinction between Muslim used as an adjective and Islamic.
However, “[t]he term Muslim is increasingly identified with the existing community and the practices of people
self‐identified as Muslim. The term “Islamic” has sometimes been reserved for those instances where there is a
conscious effort to reflect the fundamental principles and ideals of Islam interpreted in a relatively restrictive way.
In this usage, for example, a “Muslim state” is a state where the majority of the people are Muslim, while an
“Islamic state” would be one in which there is a formal program of implementation of the regulations and ideals of
Islam. “Islam” remains the identification of the religion underlying both usages.” Voll, supra note 116, at 360.
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varieties of reasons behind such resistance or rejection of modern constitutionalism, the
argument this paper advance is that the concerns behind it, from the perspective of the theory
of state, are largely the same. The reticence of contemporary states to modern
constitutionalism is accompanied by fierce attack by many scholars; such attack explains to a
large extent why there is no doctrinal agreement about what constitutionalism is at the first
place. In my account, this skepticism towards, resistance and rejection of modern
constitutionalism, is not explicable by reference to religious or cultural particularities, but
rather by the fact that we are looking at new realities with old lenses.163
Modern constitutionalism is indeed crystallized as a result of the development of both
international law and national legal systems, towards more protection of human rights. It is
true that the centrality of human rights may have traces that can be found as late as the end of
the 19th century, where international law developed towards imposing more limitations on
states in times of armed conflicts. Such evolution had had a considerable success and known
large diffusion following the dissolution of the USSR. In my narration, however, modern
constitutionalism, in which the protection of human rights is an essential component, is not the
product of the late 19th century, or the post‐Soviet Union, it is rather the result of the post‐
Second World War. States that witnessed the atrocities of gross violations of human rights
during the Second World War seem to be saying, through modern constitutionalism: ‘never
again’. Modern constitutionalism is nothing else but that normative order that makes ‘never
again’ a legal reality in domestic legal systems. Accordingly, the development of modern
constitutionalism, in which protection of human rights is an essential part, is not Western, but
universal by definition.
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I borrowed this metaphor from Schauer, interested in discussing what other scholars refer to as ‘imposed
constitutionalism’, “In this paper I seek to explain this phenomenon, a phenomenon that will, en passant, illustrate
why seeing constitutions as necessarily either indigenous or imposed is invariably to see today’s constitutions
through yesterday’s lenses.” Frederick Schauer, On Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN. L. REV. 907, 907
(2005).

